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Civil No. 7723 
In the Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
N. J. MEAGHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JoE T. JuHAN, PAUL STocK, RAY PHEBus, 
and AsHLEY VALLEY OIL CoMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT N. J. MEAGHER. 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT. 
For the convenience of the court we have attached 
at the end of this brief a title chart. It is a reproduc-
tion of the illustrative chart submitted by respondent 
Meagher in the proceedings below and was identified 
as Exhibit A 57. 
This action requires determination of the ownership 
of the lessees' rights under an oil and. gas lease cover-
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2 
ing 480 acres of land. Respondent Meagher claims 
ownership of an undivided ·y2 interest as to oil only 
in the lessees' rights in a 440-acre parcel of the above 
tract. In this phase of the controversy, appellants 
,Juhan, Stock and Phebus are his adversaries. This 
brief is in answer to the brief filed by those appellants. 
Respondent Meagher also claims ownership of all of 
the lessees' rights in the remaining 40 acres of the 
tract (known as the North Forty), and in that contro-
versy only appellant Ashley ·valley Oil Company has 
appealed. Appellant Ashley Valley Oil Company has 
filed a brief and respondent Meagher will file herewith 
a separate brief in answer thereto. 
In view of the foregoing, unless otherwise specified, 
reference in this brief to the lands in litigation will 
refer to the 440-acre tract. 
The basic theory of Meagher's case may be summa-
rized thus : Meagher is the owner of the lands involved 
subject to a valid oil and gas lease1 and subject to cer-
tain royalties. In Octo her 1944 the lessees' rights to 
explore for and produce oil were owned by Stock and 
Phebus (an undivided ·lh each). At that time Meagher 
believed the lease to be forfeit and knew that no de-
1Meagher, of course, recognizes and does not seek to circum-
vent in any way the previous ruling of this court on the first 
appeal which determined that the lease was not forfeit and had 
not been abandoned. I-Iowever, the decision upon appeal did not 
purport to determine_ the ownership or quantum of the various 
outstanding interests in the property. 
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veloptnent for oil had been conducted during the pre-
ceding 15 years. He requested releases from the lessees. 
Stock did release. Phebus did not. Meagher thereby 
becan1e entitled to an undivided 1f2 of the lessees' rights, 
i.e., the interest 'vhich Stock released to Meagher. 
At page ·1 of appellants' brief the action is correctly 
described as involving ''the legal effect of a document 
designated ~release', Exhibit ~ A'-30, executed by appel-
lant Stock in favor of respondent Meagher under date 
of October 21. 1944.'' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Respondent reluctantly criticizes appellants' state-
nlent of facts. Except for a few conclusions motivated 
by the enthusiasm of advocacy, it is correct as far as 
it goes. But it definitely fails to state the whole truth 
and therefore casts the case in an inaccurate factual 
atmosphere. 
This phase of the action is concerned with the right to 
explore for and produce oil only on a 440-acre parcel of 
land. That right is derivative from an oil and gas lease 
(A-1), executed in 1924. 
By 1929 the lessee's right to explore for and produce 
oil had descended by mesne transfers to Stock and 
Phebus, each having acquired an undivided ~ interest 
in the lessee'~ right~ under the leasehold. We thu~ 
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4 
have two lines of title to the lessee's right in oil; one 
is traceable to Stock, the other to Phebus. 
The original lease, known as the Sheridan lease, was 
executed in June 1924 (A-1). The lessee's rights to 
explore for and produce oil and gas thereunder passed 
to Utah Oil Refining Company in 1924 (A-2). Explora-
tion was conducted. Oil was not discovered in paying 
quantities but gas was produced. Utah Oil Refining 
Company operated the property until· 1929, when that 
Company transferred its rights to Stock and Phebus 
(A-11). These men, through the Valley Fuel Supply 
Company (which they owned), operated the gas prop-
erty until 1941. Then the equipment was sold to Juhan, 
the wells were dismembered and the gas operations 
ceased. In the sale of the equipment to Juhan the les-
sees' rights to explore for and produce gas were also 
transferred to him (A-17). 
By 1927 respondent Meagher through several con-
veyances had acquired the fee to the lands in question 
subject to outstanding royalty interests and subject to 
the oil and gas lease (A-7-8-9-10). 
In 1931, Stock and Phebus tried to get the Standard 
Oil Con1pany of California to make further explora-
tions. The leasehold .was assigned to Standard for this 
purpose (A-12), which in turn assigned it to its operat-
ing subsidiary, The California Company (A-13). It re-
mained in this status for three years and then Standard 
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and its snb~idiary decided not to go forward and the 
lessee·~ rights \vere transferred back to Stock and 
Phebus in .Jiarch of 1934 (A-14). Ten nrore years 
elapsed. By 1944 it \Vas obvious that the property was 
not con1n1ercially attractive for gas production. Stand-
ard had declined developtnent for oil and, except for 
the fortner gas operations, Stock and Phebus, who had 
held the lessee'~ rights, had not been able to do any-
thing with the property over a period of 15 years. 
Under these circumstances, the usual practice among 
reliable oil operators is to quitclaim the leasehold back 
to the landowner to clear his title. Note that this is 
what Standard and its subsidiary did when they decided 
not to carry on. Since these releases were not forth-
coming, Meagher did what any landowner would do 
under the circumstances. He asked Stock and Phebus 
for releases. 
Nearly a year went by from the time Meagher began 
to clear up his title, and finally, to bring the matter to 
a head, Meagher commenced this quiet title action in 
October of 1944. Four days after the action was com-
menced the release which Meagher had requested from · 
Stock was executed and delivered. Meagher thereby ac-
quired the undivided 1j2 interest in the lessee's rights 
to oil which is the ~ubject of this action. However, 
Phebus did not comply with Meagher's request and 
retained his 1;2 interest. The release \vhich Stock gave 
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Meagher at that time (A-30) Is the document upon 
which this litigation hinges. 
Meanwhile, Juhan, who had acquired the lessee's 
rights to gas at the time the gas equipment was junked, 
proceeded to interest himself in the property for fur-
ther exploration. He apparently thought that the 
proper way to acquire the right to explore for oil would 
be to obtain a lease from Meagher. He asked Meagher 
for such a lease and was turned down. Then he decided 
that perhaps there was vitality in the old lease held 
by Stock and Phebus. He made a deal with Phebus by 
which he acquired the ·% interest Phebus had. Then he 
sent his man around to Stock for the same purpose, 
but Stock told Juhan's representative that he had al-
ready released back to Meagher. 
N 0"\\7 we come to the key to the ''equities'' in this 
case. Did Stock at this time ask Meagher for a rescis-
sion of the release he had given~ No. Did Stock re-
quest an opportunity to reinstate his position as a 
former lessee~ . No. Did Stock claim any n1istake of 
fact or of law~ Not at all. He merely gave Juhan's 
n1an, one Charles .s. Hill, a quitclaim of his (Stock's) 
interest (A-19). The entire transaction was made ex-
pressly subject to two unrecorded written understand-
ings designated "declaration of trust" (A-48), (A-49) 
(Appendix A infra), which recognized that Meagher 
claimed an adverse interest and provided that if Juhan 
could overcome Meagher's claims Stock would partici-
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7 
pate in the victory to the extent of one-eighth, but if 
Meagher should prevail Stock would get nothing. 
The above is not a recital of fact based on surmise 
or circun1stantial evidence. It is ad1nitted in the testi-
mony of Stoek and. is established by \Vritten documents 
whieh 'vere produced only after contested discovery 
proceedings during· the pretrial hearings. 
In other 'vords, less than six n1onths after Stock had 
released to ~Ieagher, he tried to transfer the same 
interest to Juhan through Charles S. Hill under a 
deal by which he could benefit only if the release he 
had given to ~feagher could be avoided! Stock made 
no demands whatsoever upon Meagher. In fact after 
Meagher learned of the quitclaim from Stock to IIill 
he wrote to Stock about it and questioned his motives. 
Stock recei.ved this letter but did not. answer it. 
No oil had been discovered at the time. Meagher's 
suit to quiet title had already been filed. Stock was 
named as a defendant in that .suit. After the suit was 
com1nenced he executed his release in Meagher's favor. 
Yet Stock, while plotting with Juhan to avoid his own 
release, sat by in silence even after inquiry fron1 
Meagher. 
The first overt action by Stock .addressed to Meagher 
by which lVIeagher could know Stock's true position · 
was not taken until August 16, 1949. This consisted 
of Stock's voluntary appearance in the quiet title 
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suit. Prior to that, jurisdiction over Stock, a nonresi-
dent, had not been perfected. This appearance con-
Histed of an answer and counter-claim in which Stock 
belatedly sought to rescind his own release. This plead-
ing was filed four years and ten n1onths after Stock 
had given his release to Meagher, and nearly one year 
after oil had been discovered. 
It is significant that this pleading filed in Stock's 
behalf was prepared by Juhan's counsel and up to the 
day of the trial (March 6, 1951) Stock had never 
read it.2 
These are some of the facts which appellants have 
seen fit to omit in their recital. There are others. 
Appellants have suggested to this court that Stock 
has m.ade financial contributions or commitments to-
'vard the expenses of drilling. So far as concerns any 
interest Stock may clailn traceable back to his own 
former one-half interest in the lease, this is not the 
case. The true situation is that Stock and Juhan 
agreed that Juhan "\Vould do what he could to squeeze 
out Meagher and Stock would get one-eighth of what-
ever Juhan could develop out of Stock's former one-
half interest. Stock n1ade no financial con1mitn1ent in 
connection with that transaction. 
2This is not set forth to reflect upon Juhan's counsel. It is 
significant, however, that Stock looked entirely to Juhan to over-
come Meagher's claim and has not ·to this day personally 
espoused the elaborate legal theories upon which Juhan seeks to 
overthrow Stock's release to Meagher. 
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':rhe fa(•ts behind Stock's investment are these: Long 
after Stock quitclai1ued to Juhan the privilege of liti-
gating 'vith l\Ieagher, ·he did purchase frotn Juhan a 
new participation in the deal. This occurred in July of 
1948. But that acquisition was lhnited to the one-half 
interest owned by Phebus. Stock himself testified that 
purchase \vas designed to get him an interest, ''win, 
lose or drawH in the litigation with Meagher. Stock 
did pay n1oney to Juhan for that participation, but the 
Phebus line of title to one half of the lessee's rights is 
not under attack by Meagher and any expenditure of 
Stock for a portion thereof has no bearing whatsoever 
upon the present ownership of the one-half interest 
with which this litigation is concerned; "the one-half in-
terest formerly owned by Stock and transferred to 
Meagher by Stock. 
The foregoing facts take on substantial stature when 
one considers the pious plea for "equity" which has 
been made in this case in Stock's behalf. 
In vie'v of the numerous points raised by appel-
lants in their brief, respondent Meagher requests the 
C'ourt 's indulgence if the recital of additional factual 
matters is set forth in connection with the argument 
of the particular legal points to which they are rel-
evant. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
To enable the court to readi1y locate Meagher's com-
Jnents with respect to the nine points raised by appel-
lants, each is set forth below, and in the argument, in 
the order presented by appellants. The tenth point 
hereunder is raised by respondent: 
1. The court did not err in permitting Meagher 
to amend his reply to meet issues raised by 
defendants' pleadings. 
2. Meagher is the real party in interest for the 
purposes of this litigation. 
3. Meagher is neither guilty of laches nor is he 
estopped to assert his interest in the leasehold. 
4. Meagher is guilty of no fraudulent conduct 
whatsoever. 
5. The Stock to Meagher transfer IS supported 
by a legal consideration. 
6. The Stock to ~feagher transfer may not be 
rescinded on the ground of mistake. 
7. The Stock to Meagher transfer, viewed as a 
surrender, is a valid relinquishment of Stock's 
interest in the lease to Meagher. 
(a) The transfer is nqt affected by the pro-
visions of Exhibit A 5, the modification of 
the lease. 
(b) The transfer does not lack consideration. 
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(c) Stock 'vas fully e1npowered t.o surrender to 
the reversioner, ~{eaghel\ \vhatever interest 
he had in the leasehold. 
(d) :J[eagher "·a~ the o'vner of the reversion-
ary rights in the property and as such was 
eligible to receive a surrender. 
S. The Stock to l\Ieagher transfer, viewed as a 
conveyance, i8 effective to transfer Stock's in-
terest in the lease to ~leagher. 
9. :Jieagher ·s lando,vner's royalty interest can be 
adjudicated in this action. 
10. Stock is barred by laches from asserting rescis-
sion of his transfer to Meagher. 
ARGUMENT. 
1. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING MEAGHER 
TO AMEND HIS REPLY TO MEET ISSUES RAISED BY 
DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS. 
It is correct that when this quiet title action was 
commenced on October 17, 1944, Stock had not then 
transferred his one-half interest to Meagher. This was 
done on October 21, 1944, four days after the co1nplaint 
was filed. 
It is also true that l?hebus had not then transferred 
his one-half interest in the lease to Juhan. · This trans-
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fer to Juhan (A-18) was not given until January 19, 
1945. Also, Stock had not then made his second trans-
fer of his one-half interest (A-19) to Juhan's man 
Charles Hill. This occurred on April 14, 1945. 
T-Iowever, before Juhan answered, these two docu-
Inents, upon which his elaims depend, had been exe-
cuted. His answer asserts all lessee's rights in the 
lease and asks the court to affirmatively declare his 
interests to be superior to any claim of Meagher. 
In this situation Juhan's answer becomes· an affirm-
ative pleading seeking to quiet a title acquired by him 
subsequent to the filing of the co~plaint. In reply to 
such a pleading, Meagher is entitled to set forth any 
title he acquired prior to the filing of Juhan's plead-
ing. This issue was argued and briefed before the trial 
court, and neither in the court below nor here have 
appellants met the authorities submitted in support of 
Meagher's position. We will briefly summarize them 
here: 
Where the defendant in a quiet title suit seeks affirm-
ative relief and raises issue of title acquired by him 
after commencement of the suit, the plaintiff can n1eet 
such issues by proof of title acquired by him after suit 
is flied and prior to the time of filing defendant's 
pleading. 
Rowley v. Davis ( 1917), 34 Cal. App. 184, 167 
Pac. 162. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
In the aboY~ rase, a suit to quiet title, defendant 
set up a record title clain1 and sought affirmative re-
lief. The plaintiff \Yns pertnitted to resist the defend-
ant's affir1nativ~ clain1s by proof of title acquired by 
plaintiff subseq11ent to filing the complaint but prior 
to the filing of defendant'~ pleading. rrhe decision in 
favor of plaintiff was affirined by the appellate court 
and a petition for hearing in the Supreme Court was 
denied. The appellate opinion contains the following 
explanation of the rule and the reasons for it: 
''Referring to the record thus presented, appel-
lant insists that the judgment should be reversed 
because the action n1ust be determined upon the 
facts as they existed at the time of the commence-
Inent of the suit, 'Rowley not having pleaded any 
after-acquired title.' It is true that the plaintiff 
did not attempt to supplement his complaint by a 
statement showing title aequired after the action. 
was commenced. Also it is the law that he would 
not have a right to file a supplemental complaint 
showing after-acquired title, if in fact he had not 
title at the con1mencernent of the action. (Citing 
cases.) But the cross-complaint of the defendant 
Davis was not filed until after plaintiff Rowley 
had acquired the title of the defendant and cross-
defendant Alice Huse. By filing that cross-com-
plaint the cross-cornplainant tendered new issues 
whereby he set up a cause of action which. relates 
to the date of filing the cross-complaint. This he 
had the right to do. (Citing cases.) The fact that 
Rowley had at that tin1e acquired the title of 
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Mrs. Huse was available to him as a defense to 
the cross-action and was provable under his claim 
of ownership as pleaded by his answer to the 
cross-complaint. If this were not so, a defendant 
by filing a cross-complaint would be able to pre-
vent the plaintiff fro1n dismissing an action which 
had been prematurely brought, and might thereby 
obtain 'on the merits' a judgment which possibly 
would permanently cut out the just rights of the 
plaintiff by preventing hiln from thereafter litigat-
ing the title with the cross-complainant. We there-
fore are of the opinion that the judgment should 
be sustained, if the evidence is sufficient to support 
Rowley's title as existing at the time of filing the 
cross-complaint.'' 
Also see Orloff v. Mosher (1944), 64 Cal. App. (2d) 
6, 147 Pac. (2d) 675, holding that if one of the de-
fendants conveys his interest to plaintiff pending suit, 
and another defendant files a pleading seeking to quiet 
his title, the court will test the plaintiff's title as of 
the time of filing the latter pleading. 
There can be no question that defendant Juhan has 
sought affirmative relief in this action even though his 
pleading is not designated as a counter-claim. 
In Harmon v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 Pac. (2d) 
695, it was held that if defendant files a pleading which 
contains the essential allegations of a cause of action 
it will be treated as a counter-claim no matter how 
designated and plaintiff will be obliged to· reply to it. 
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.A-\lso in Perego r. Dod,oe, 9 Utah B, 33 Pac. 221, it 
"'"as held in a quiet title aetion that if defendants deny 
the 1naterinl allegations of the romplaint, clahn title 
in then1selyes and pray that it be quieted as against 
plaintiff~. they 1nay recover upon proof of such allega-
tions regardless of ho'v their pleading is designated. 
Also see: 
Dun.hanz D. Traris, 25 Utah 65, 69 Pac. 468; 
(
1nllender v. Ct·ossfield Oil Syndicate (Mont. 
1929), 275 Pac. 273; 
Juster v. Juster (N. Dak. 1949), 37 N.W. (2d) 
879. 
Turning to Juhan's answer, ,, .. e find the affirmative 
allegation that he owns all of the lessee's rights in 
the lease and prays that his interests be ratified, con-
firmed and declared valid. It is significant that Juh8,n 
had no interest in the lease so far as concerns oil when 
the con1plaint was filed or until J anua.ry 19, 1945, when 
he acquired the Phebus one-half interest (A-18). Then 
on April 14, 1945, his representative Hill acquired 
the abortive quitclaim front Stock ( A-19). These are 
the two docu1nents upon which Juhan must rest his 
claims to any interest in the lease so far as concerns 
oil. One deals 'vith the Phebus line of title which re-
spondent Meagher does not oppose, the other seeks to 
revive the Stock line of title which, however, had pre-
viously been interrupted by Stock's transfer to Meagher 
of October, 1944 (A-30). 
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Meagher does not object to the fact that Juhan in 
his answer sets forth titles acquired by hirn subsequent 
to commencement of the action. The authorities sup-
port a defendant's right to do this. 
Rucker v. Jackson, 180 Ala. 109, 60 So. 139; 
Nor.ris v. United Mineral Products Co. (Wyo.), 
158 Pac. (2d) 679; 
Lortz v. Rose (Mo.), 145 S.W. (2d) 385. 
In Norris v. United Mineral Products, Co., supra, 
an action to quiet title, defendant had acquired rights 
in the property after the complaint was filed but prior 
to filing answer. The court considered the rule in eject-
ment where this procedure is available to a defendant 
and said: 
''If a new ti tie acquired during the pendency of 
an ejectment action may be interposed by the de-
fendant as a defense to that action, it is difficult to 
perceive 'vhy it may not be done in a suit to quiet 
title. * * * The law does not look with approval 
upon a multiplicity of suits and where all matters 
in controversy between the parties as to the title 
or possession of real property may well be con-
cluded in one action that should be done.'' 
The above authorities mere~y show that ,Juhan was 
entitled to bring into this action the interests he 
claimed in the lease even though acquired after coin-
plaint was filed. U :rider such circumstances, it u1ust 
follow that Meagher can plead anything which 'vill 
defeat or minimize Juhan's claim to an after-acquired 
title. Meagher's first reply denied any validity to 
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Juhan's claim. Hi~ ulthnate reply n1erely alleged that 
Juhan ~s rights w·ere of lesse'r e~rtent than the interests 
asserted. 
Our conunents with respect to Juhan also apply to 
Phebus.3 
So far as concerns Stock, there can be no dispute. 
His ans\ver 'vhen finally filed in 1949 alleges that he 
claims an interest in the lease adverse to the claims 
of ~feagher, and his counterclain1 seeks to rescind his 
transfer to ~!eagher. 
The background bringing into issue these leasehold 
interests has already been explained. Meagher, in the 
original trial, contended that the lease had been for-
feited or abandoned and therefore any question of 
ownership of interests therein was, of course, inuna-
terial. After the appeal and the determination by this 
court that Meagher's interests were subject to the 
outstanding interests in the leasehold, it was entirely 
proper in the further proceedings which were ordered 
by this court for Meagher to set forth the limitations 
upon the interests in the leasehold claimed by his ad-
versaries and the existence of such interests in hi1nself. 
The amended reply 1nerely serves this purpose. 
art is not clear on what basis appellant Phebus remains in this 
litigation. It is apparent from the record that he has disposed 
of all interest which he ever had in the property. However, he 
was belatedly permitted to adopt the answer of Juhan as his 
own ( R. 43) and in so far as he does thereby remain in the 
action he, of course, accedes to and approves of all of ,Juhan's 
claims. 
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There can be ·no dispute that a plaintiff who clain1s 
a fee simple in a quiet title action but proves owner-
ship of some lesser estate will not be foreclosed from a 
decree adjudicating that lesser estate. 
In State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 Pac. 987, this court 
said: 
''In an action to quiet title the plaitiff 1nay 
allege his title, ownership and possession in gen-
eral terms, and thereafter 1nay prove whatever title 
he has.'' 
See also: 
Tarpey v. Dese-rt Salt ,Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 Pac. 
338; 
Gordon v. Oadwalader, 172 Cal. 254, 156 Pac. 471; 
Nadeau v. Texas Company (Mont. 1937), 69 Pac . 
. (2d) 586. 
The development of this litigation has required 
Meagher to reduce the quantum of his claim but his 
basic controversy with appellants has . never changed. 
Since the day the original complaint was filed, Meagher 
has claimed interests. in this land in opposition to appel-
lants. All appellants ·have set forth their claims and 
have asked for determination thereof. Those interestf' 
cannot be determined unless their lhnitations are also 
determined. The second trial has been conducted in 
conformity with the prior mandate of this court. It has 
determined who owns what interests in this property, 
heeding always the decree of this court that the lease 
itself was neither forfeited nor abandoned. 
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2. MEAGHER IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST FOR TH.E 
PURPOSES OF THIS LITIGATION. 
On January :27, 1948, ~[eagher quitclaimed to his 
children all of his right, title and interest in the prop-
erty excepting his lando,vner 's royalty (A -22). 
That conveyance 'vas intended to be just what it 
purports to be, namely, a transfer of whatever Meagher 
had, excepting only his landowner's royalty. It was 
made during the pendenry of this action and more than 
three years after Stock had given his release to 
Meagher. 
Prior to his conveyance to his children, Meagher was 
the sole o'vner of the interests transferred and as such 
was the legal and equitable real party in interest. After 
that transfer ~Ieagher 'vas acting as trustee for his 
children in the prosecution of this litigation and as such 
was the legal real party in interest. 
The provisions of Section 104-3-19 Utah Code Anno-
tated, quoted in appellants' brief clearly support 
Meagher's right to continue this action in his nan1e, 
and Rule 25 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
also cited by appellants sets forth the same principle. 
Smith Land Co. v. Johnson, 100 Utah 342, 107 
Pac. (2d) 158; 
Brighant City v. Chase, 30 Utah 410, 85 Pac. 436; 
Lowell v. Parkinson, 4 Utah 64, 66, 6 Pac. 58; 
Firman v. Bateman, 2 Utah 268; 
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Cleverdon v. Gray, 62· Cal. App. (2d) 612, 145 
Pac. (2d) 95. 
In fa~t, in pleading to the Stock answer and counter-
claim Meagher states that he and his grantees have 
elected to continue the action in his name. As appel-
lants point out, no proof of this was made at the trial, 
but surely there is no requirement that this election is 
an issuable and essential fact that must be alleged and 
proved! The statute states that the action can be con-
tinued in the name of the original party but if substitu-
tion is desir~d court approval is necessary. Meagher's 
pleading merely notified all concerned that l\1eagher 
and his grantees had made the election which required 
neither proof nor order. 
Appellants' argument seeks to limit the interest 
passed under the unqualified quitclaim deed fron1 
Meagher to his children by an obscure inference as to 
the state of Meagher's mind dependent upon the status 
of the pending litigation at the time of his conveyance. 
It is true that when Meagher made the transfer to his 
children he may not have known the legal extent of his 
interest in the property for the decision of this court 
concerning the leasehold had just been rendered and 
Meagher's petition for rehearing was pending. But one 
thing is certain. He did transfer to his children what-
ever he had, excepting only his landowner's royalty. 
Even now, the final determination and definition of 
Meagher's interest 'vill not' he known until this litip;a-
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tion is finally roncluded. The case of Foster v. Cont. 
Nat. Bk. of Boston (1906), 76 N.E. 338, cited by appel-
lants, involved an an1endment which sought to convert 
an action for injunetion into a suit to recover for 
monies paid. The decision points out and appellants 
concede that two separate and distinct rauses of action 
were involved. In the case at bar, however, the amend-
ment to ~feagher's reply did not bring in a new cause 
of action; nor did it change this suit from an action 
to quiet title into any other form of action; nor did it 
add to the litigation any property not previously in-
volved. The amended reply sought merely to limit 
the issues to that portion of the litigation which had 
not been determined, namely, to the determination of 
the ownership of the outstanding interests. 
One minor issue remains under this point: In describ-
ing Meagher's quitclaim deed in connection with the 
transfer to his children, appellants' brief at page 23 
states: 
"We do not concede that a leasehold interest 
can be transferred by quitclaim deed * 
And on page 28 it is stated: 
"The document itself, unorthodox in its form as 
a transfer of an oil and gas leasehold interest 
... , 
This suggestion baffles us. Surely counsel must know 
that the quitclaim is the most common form of docu-
nlent employed to transfer oil and gas leasehold inter-
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ests. It is ·frequently employed when lessees transfer 
back to landowners once they have decided not to con-
duct additional exploratons and desire to aid the land-
owner in clearing his title. Similarly, it is frequently 
employed to transfer leasehold interests from one per-
son to another where the grantor desires to avoid any 
implication of warranty of title. A mere cursory re-
view of the cases in any oil state discloses the common 
use of the quitclaim deed in dealing with leasehold in-
terests. 
Thus when Meagher decided to transfer his inter-
ests in these lands to his children, knowing that the 
nature and ~xtent of his interests were disputed and 
in litigation, what better method of conveyance could 
have been employed than a simple quitclaim deed~ And 
finally note how appellants in their inter se trans-
actions used the quitclaim, e.g., Stock to. Hill (A-19), 
Hill to Juhan (A-20), Phebus to Juhan (A-18), Juhan 
to Stock (A-23), and Juhan to Equity (A-21). 
We respectfully submit that appellants dangerously 
approximate the presentation of a frivolous claim when 
they seek to 1nake any point of the fact that during 
the pendency of this litigation Meagher saw fit to 
transfer his interest in the subject matter to his chil-
dren. 
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8. MEAGHER IS NEITHER GUILTY OF LACHES NOR IS HE 
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT HIS INTEREST IN THE LEASE-
HOLD . 
.. A.ppellants continually hnply that l\ieagher 's ac-
tivities '"ere InotiYnted by the di~eovery of oil on these 
lands whirh oeeurred during the pendency of this liti-
gation. Thi~ is shnply not the fact. The only thing 
'vhich has altered ~[eagher ·~ contentions since the 
complaint 'vas filed is the decision of this court holding 
that the original lease \Yas neither forfeited nor aban-
doned. ,,~hen the con1plaint was filed Meagher believed 
and asserted that the old lease 'vas a nullity. Accord-
ingly~ he alleged that he was the owner .of the fee 
simple and requested a decree establishing that the 
claims of defendants "·ere groundless. When this court 
deter1nined that the old leasehold had vitality, it re-
Inanded the ease for further proceedings. Meagher 
then \vas required to examine the status of the various 
interests and in doing so he was obliged to admit: 
(1) The gas rights under the lease were still out-
standing/ and (2) an undivided % of the oil rights 
4As to the gas rights, 1\ileagher believes and alleged that these 
rights had been transferred back to Stock and Phebus by their 
corporation, Valley Fuel Supply Co., in order to enable them to 
clear the title for development by Standard Oil Company and its 
subsidiaries. If this had occurred, an interest in the gas rights 
would have passed to Meagher with Stock's release. But Meagher 
was able to produce no documentary proof and the circumstan-
tial evidenre developed at the trial, although substantial, was 
neve1theless held insufficient to overcon1e the record title pos-
sessed by Juhan. 
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were still outstanding. The gas rights had passed to 
.Juhan by the assignment from Valley Fuel Supply 
Company (A-17). The outstanding lj2 of the oil rights 
had passed to Juhan fro1n Phebus by the quitclaim 
deed of January 19, 1945 (A-1.8). 
But as to the remaining lj2 of the oil rights-the 
portion formerly owned by Stock-Meagher was the 
owner. He had obtained this interest from Stock by 
the release of Octo her 21, 1944 ( A-30). Any claim of 
anyone else as to this % interest must come only 
through the quitclaim of April 14, 1945 (A-19) from 
Stock to Charles S. Hill (Juhan's man). That quit-
claim can only have effect if the release 'vhich Stock 
gave 1\feagher six 1nonths before can be avoided. 
The controversy over the rights in these lands had 
been narrowed by this court '.s decision, but there was 
still a substantial controversy. The appellants claimed 
the entire leasehold rights. The claims of appellants 
exceeded their actual interests. Meagher was free to 
prove that he owned the remaining leasehold interests. 
Appellants now charge ~feagher with laches predi-
cated upon the interval 'vhieh elapsed between the 
issuance of the remittitur from this court on March 16, 
1948, and Meagher's next move in the trial court which 
was a motion filed April 22, 1949. There was no such 
delay. Appendix B of "significant events" contained 
in appellants' brief fails to note that after the remit-
titur issued rnore litigation ensued and actually the 
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(lase 'vas brought to the Supren1P Court for the second 
time. .As noted in the trial court's opinion: '• Then 
caine the eonfu~ion, induced by the defendants (other 
than Stock)~ resulting· frou1 this eourt 's entry of an 
unnecessar~~ and invalid • Order \:a eating and Setting 
Aside Decree .A.s To Certain Defendants', the obtain-
ing of the ruling of this court upon that act which 
occupied all parties until, at least N ove1nber 8, 1948, 
'vhen the decision of the Supreme .Court in 198 Pac. 
(2d) 173 was filed, and n1ore certainly until February 
8, 1949, 'vhen this court, upon the suggestion of the 
Supre1ne Court, filed its Order Setting Aside Judg-
ment, thus clearing the record for the further proceed-
ings directed by that court.'' There was thus a wait 
from .February 8, 1949 to April 22, 1949, before Meag-
her acted in the trial court. 
We trust it will not violate the record to point 
out that re~pondent l\Ieagher obtained additional coun-
sel during this interval. Certainly the court will take 
judiGial notice of the fact that time is necessary for 
new counsel to becon1e familiar with a case of this 
character. 
~rhus when the facts ·are stated accurately, it be-
comes evident that there were no substantial delays 
at all in the prosecution of Meagher's claims. 
Moreover Meagher was under no obligation to act 
quiekly at the ri~k of losing his rights. Certainly ap-
pellants Ntock and Juhan were fully aware of Meag-
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her's interest in the leasehold. Stock had conveyed 
it to Meagher and ,Juhan had brought Stock back into 
the deal under a private understanding expressly con-
tingent upon the elin1ination of Meagher's interest. As 
\vill be pointed out in the argument concerning estop-
pel, Meagher had no obligation and indeed had no 
right to prevent the drilling which was conducted 
during this period. But when litigation is pending and 
a lis pendens is on file (A-42) we know of no case 
where a party has lost his rights in the absence of a 
motion to dismiss predicated upon the usual statutory 
grounds requiring dismissal for want of prosecution. 
When the original complaint was filed these appel-
lants knew that ~{eagher claimed they had no interest 
in the lands. After the appeal was determined and 
the case was remanded for further proceedings, these 
appellants must have known that Meagher in those 
proceedings would assert his right to an undivided 1h 
interest in the lease. 
Finding of . Fact No. 1 states : ''There has been no 
undue or substantial delay in the assertion of his claim 
or in the prosecution of this litigation by Meagher." 
The trial court did not err in denying appellants' claim 
of laches. 
Let us now turn to the allege} estoppel. We have 
carefully scrutinized appellants' brief to ascertain each 
speeific ground upon which estoppel is charged. These 
assertions and Meagher's answers are as follows: 
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.. :\ppellants say: Meagher failed to assert his claim 
under the Stoek release 'vhen he receiYPd it. We an-
swer: ~I eagher 's original, although erroneous, con-
tention "·as that the lease \\·as Yoid. In such event 
Stock's release 'vould have nterged in ~Ieagher's fee 
and proof of that interest by !!leagher 'vould have been 
entirely ilntna terial. 
Appellants also ~ay: :\leagher is estopped because 
he first took the position that the lease was void and 
now seeks to establish an i1tterest in it. We answer: 
There is nothing inconsistent, unconscionable, or un-
usual for a lando,vner to assert a greater estate than 
the proof supports. The greater includes the lesser. 
Conversely, appellants could not be misled by the fact 
that ~leagher originally asserted that they had no 
interest and later (after the decision of this court) 
conceded in his amended reply that appellants owned 
a partial interest. Appellants could not be prejudiced 
by a change in the pleadings by which Meagher con-
ceded something to them. However, the point is that 
throughout the litigation appellants kne'v that any 
clailns they asserted were vigorously contested by 
Meagher. The fact that originally he said they had no 
interest and later said they had only a fractional in-
terest, raises no basis for estoppel. 
Appellants claim that Meagher is estopped by ac-
cepting the fruits of the first decree. We answer: This 
argtnnent is sintply beyond comprehension. We know 
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of" no decree in this litigation which has as ·yet yielded 
any benefits to Meagher. Surely appellants do not 
refer to the original decree of the trial court 'vhich 
was reversed. Possibly appellants have in mind the 
elementary principle that estoppel by decree can only 
arise when the party against whom it is asserted has 
derived son1e benefit from a previous decree. This is 
good law but it has no application to the facts of 
this case. 
Appellants assert that Meagher is estopped, urging 
that he did not tin1ely assert his claims to an m-
terest in the lease after this court determined that 
the lease was valid and existing. This has been an-
swered in our discussion above with respect to laches. 
Appellants argue that Meagher is estopped because 
he knew that Stock executed a quitclaim to Charles 
S. Hill (A-19) some time after Stock had released to 
Meagher. The short answer to this is that Meagher 
took all appropriate action to advise Stock of 
Meagher's position and to ascertain Stock's intentions. 
The quiet title suit had already been commenced. 
Meagher had already obtained a release from Stock. 
But he did more, he 'vrote to Stock (A-39) and asked 
why the quitclaim had been given to Hill. He pointed 
out that he, Meagher, was no"r the owner of Stock's 
for1ner interest in the property. He pointed out that 
deeds of this kind "just rness up an abstract of title". 
He also pointed out the confusion the quitclaim would 
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cause in vie",. of the obligation of Stock to reconvey 
son1e outstanding lando,vners' royalty. This was posi-
tive aetion on ~1eagher's part and is entirely incon-
sistent 'vith appellants' clahn that l[eap;her led Stock 
to believe that l\Ieagher had 'va.ived any rights or 
rlailns or that lieagher acquiesced in Stock's quitclaim 
to Hill. Certainly upon receipt of this letter it was 
Stock~s duty to speak up if he intended to repudiate 
his for1ner release. Stock received Meagher's letter. 
What did he do? He simply ignored it. It was not 
answered . 
. We are eonvinced that no impropriety would be 
intentionally indulged by any of our opposing counsel. 
But in discussing this point we must call attention to 
an inadvertence which involves a gross misstatement 
of the record. At page 33 of appellants' brief, in 
referring to the release Stock gave to Meagher, they 
say: .. Notwithstanding it was repudiated by Stock 
six month~ after it was obtained, still respondent made 
no complaint." When appellants say that "respondent 
made no complaint" they overlook the vigorous com-
plaint addressed to Stock in the letter (A-39) discussed 
above. Thus the facts are that even though 1\tfeagher 
did co1nplain and did ask Stock for an explanation, 
Stock remained secretive as to his intentions. 
Appellants seek to estop Meagher by a remarkably 
obtuse line of reasoning predicated upon the fact that 
Meagher transferred his interest in the property to his 
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children pending the litigation. We answer that no 
inference can be drawn that a n1an "raives any rights 
in favor of strangers merely because he transfers his 
interest in property to his children. 
Appellants argue that Meagher is estopped because 
he did not try to stop appellants and their assigns 
fro1n drilling on the property. We answer: Once this 
court determined that the oil and gas lease had not 
been extinguished any party having a portion of the 
lessee's rights also has a clear right to conduct op-
erations on the property. When two or more persons 
own an interest in land, either can deYelop it. When 
two or more persons own lessee's interests in an oil 
lease either can develop under it. 
In Buchanan v. Jencks, 38 R. I. 443, 96 Atl. 307, the 
court said: 
"A tenant in con1mon has the right to divest 
himself of his entire interest in the common prop-
erty· and _thus bring into association with his 
former co-tenants one who has theretofore been 
a stranger to the title, and this he may do in-
dependently and 'vithout the consent of such co-
tenants.'' 
In Prairie Oil d!i Gas Co. v. Allen ( C.C.A. 8th), 2 Fed. 
( 2d) 566, the court held that 'vhere property is held by 
tenants in comn1on each has the right 'vithout consent 
of any other to explore for and produce oil and gas. At 
page 571 the court said: 
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4
' Tenant~ in ron1n1on a rP the o'vners of the 
substance of the estate. They n1ay n1ake such 
reasonable use of the co1nmon property as iH 
necessary to enjoy the benefit~ and value of such 
o'vner5hip. Since an estate of a co-tenant in a 
Inine or oil 'Yell can only be enjoyed by removing 
the products thereof, the taking of 1nineral from 
a mine and the extraction of oil fro1n an oil well 
are the use and not the destruction of the estate. 
This being true, a tenant in comn1on without the 
consent of his co-tenant, . has the right to develop 
and operate the co1nmon property for oil and gas 
and for that purpose may drill wells and erect 
necessary plants.'' 
In Dav-is r. Byrd, 185 S.W. (2d) 866, one co-tenant 
sought to restrain the lessee of another co-tenant from 
developing the property under a mineral lease. In 
approving the trial court's dismissal of the petition, 
the opm1on .says : 
'' Injtmction will not lie at the instance of one 
eo-tenant to restrain another co-tenant or his 
lessee from conducting mining operations on the 
comn1on property unless it appears that such 
tenant in con1mon or his lessee has excluded or 
prevented the .complaining co-tenant from exer-
cising the sa1ne rights and privileges.'' 
The sa1ne rule applies between co-lessees as distin-
guished fro1n co-owners of the fee. In Allies Oil Co. 
v. Ayer.s, 152 La. 19; 92 So. 720, one co-lessee drilled an 
oil well and obtained production after his co-lessee had 
refused to participate. It was held that the non-
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participating co-lessee was entitled to one-half of the 
production less one-half of the expense, the court 
saying: 
''For to the extent that they were invested by 
the owner with the right to sever the oil from the 
land, plaintiff and defendant occupied towards 
each other exactly the same relations as if they 
owned the land in common.'' 
Such action by a co-tenant or co-lessee merely im-
poses upon the acting party an obligation to account 
to the other for his share of the net production. The 
drilling, not being an adverse act,. cannot be stopped 
by the other party in interest. One cannot be estopped 
for failing to prevent action which one has no right 
to enjoin. 
Meagher had already given formal and adequate 
notice to all concerned that he claimed interests in the 
property adverse to the interests claimed by them. 
What better notice could be given than the pendency 
of an unfinished quiet ti tie action' The lis pendens 
filed May 4, 1945, notified not only these appellants 
but the world that the property rights in this land 
were in litigation and until that litigation was con-
cluded no one, much less the litigants, had any basis 
for assuming that Meagher was willing to accept less 
than his lawful interest. 
The equity platitudes which follow in the remainder 
of this portion of appellants' brief tempt us to vio-
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late the restraints to 'vhich the dignity of this court 
is en ti tied. 
Here 'Ye have Stock and Juhan asserting a title 
based upon a quitclaiin executed six 1nonths after the 
same interest had been transferred to }Ieagher. They 
not only kne""" of the transfer but Juhan's representa-
tive took Stock's quitclain1 with the express under-
standing that Stock 'vould receive nothing unless 
they could subsequently avoid the prior transfer to 
Meagher.5 
Appellants called the Stock to Meagher transfer an 
H after thought." There is no basis for this. It is 
true :hieagher did not consider he 'vould need it to 
establish his rights for he thought he owned a fee 
simple. But it was no "after thought" once the 
various interests in the leasehold became relevant. 
Appellants would set aside the release as ''a writing 
ahnost forgotten.'' Forgotten by whom 1 Certainly not 
by ~Ieagher. Certainly not by Juhan or Stock. Their 
deal 'vas that Stock would get something only if this 
"writing aln1o~t forgotten" could be rescinded. 
These 1nen 'vho now plead that ''they at every moment 
acted as reasonable men" and say: "There is not a 
5The slight value Stock placed upon his own chances of avoid-
ing the prior release is eloquently proved by the fact that all he 
was to get fro1n his quitclaim to Juhan via Hill was one-eighth 
of whatever Juhan could wrest from ~ieagher. Stock said in 
effect: "Here is nothing, but if you can make something out of 
it you can have seven-eights of it." 
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scintilla of evidence to put in question their good faith 
and honest purpose,'' are the same men ~ho realized 
for years that rescission of the Stock release would 
be necessary for them to control the entire leasehold. 
Did they take any action to rescind the document? 
They did not. When Meagher learned of the Stock to 
Hill quitclaim and recognized that was confusing to the 
title, he wrote to Stock about it. Did Stock reply and 
assert his position' He did not. On the contrary, these 
men of ''good faith and honest purpose'' have hoped all 
along that the ''writing almost forgotten'' would be for-
gotten. But when the relevancy of this document be-
came apparent it was urged by Meagher and then for 
the first and only time Stock and his associates made 
a belated effort to rescind it. 
They talk as though Meagher sat by and took no 
action until after oil was discovered. This is not true. 
He commenced this proceeding four years before oil 
was discovered and has never dismissed it. But Stock 
is guilty of the very charge which is leveled at 
Meagher. When he n1ade his deal with Juhan in 1945, 
Stock knew nothing would come of it unless his prior 
transfer to Meagher could be set aside. That was a 
few months after Meagher had commenced this suit. 
Yet Stock made no move to set it aside for four years 
and ten months after execution. Moreover, Stock 
waited for eleven months after oil was discovered be-
fore he took his first step. It was Stock, not Meagher, 
who deferred action until discovery of oil. 
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The authoritie~ cited in this section of appellants' 
brief need not be review'ed. R·P~pondent aecepts their 
principles. They even apply to the facts of this case, 
but only in this "~ay: the cited cases de1nonst.rate why 
Stock cannot rescind the release he gave to Meagher. 
But these authorities afford appellants nothing in 
support of their elahn that ~Ieagher is estopped or 
·barred by laches. for the facts upon which these cases 
depend do not exist as against 1Ieagher. 
Estoppel requires at least two elements, (1) repre-
sentation, and (2) reliance. The above comments show 
the complete absence of any representation by Meagher 
indicating any intention on his part to forego his rights 
and clahns. This alone 'vould preclude estoppel. 
But in addition, even if son1e representation could 
be conceived, the other essential element-reliance-is 
not present. 
We find no contention that any action by Meagher 
involves an estoppel with respect to any defendant 
other than Stock. But the testimony develops a remark-
ably clear absence of any reliance by Stock upon ariy 
act or lack of action by Meagher. 
First \\~e must find what it 'vas Stock did which 
can even be claimed to have been done in reliance 
upon 1\ileagher 's actions. 6 II ere we find one fact only: 
6The effect of the contrary to fact recitals contained in the 
Stock to 1\:Ieagher transfer is not treated under the subject of 
estoppel. It is fully discussed in the se~.tions on fraud and mis-
take, infra. 
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In ·1948 Stock purchased from Juhan (A-23) an in-
terest in the lease. It will be noted that Stock claims 
that his present interest in the lease is not derivative 
from the one-eighth contingent interest he was to get 
under the Stock-Hill-tT uhan deal of 1945. According 
to Stock that interest was returned to Juhan in 1948 
in the deal by which Stock for $19,500.00 received a one-
fourth interest from Juhan. Further, Stock's own tes-
tinlony discloses that his purchase in 1948 was not made 
because Stock thought. Meagher had decided to forego 
his claims, but on the contrary was made to switch 
Stock's interest in the lease from the small contingency 
he had .saved from the Stock line of title into an 
interest descending through the line of title from 
Phebus (Appendix B infra). Stock testified that when 
he obtained the 1948 quitclaim from Juhan he paid 
$19,500.007 and gave back to Juhan the old one-eighth 
contingent interest which Stock retained under the 1945 
Stock-Hill-Juhan deal. Stock also testified that he re-
gards the interest he acquired in 1948 as traceable to 
the Phebus line of title, and when that deal was nego-
tiated he was trying to get an interest in the lease 
''win, lose or draw in the case with Meagher'' By such 
a switch of interests, Stock obviously was trying to put 
himself into a position that would be free of any claim 
7Note that $6500.00 of the $19,500.00 was used to pay Phebus 
for the quitclaim (A-18) he had given Juhan on January 19, 
1945. See letter agreement between Juhan and Stock dated tTuly 
9, 1948 (A-51). 
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Meagher n1ight assert. 8 This is a far cry fro1n reliance 
upon any representation that l\1:eagher had given up 
his claims . 
..c\.ppellants' brief does not particularize as to the 
manner or extent of Stock'8 participation in the ex-
penses of drilling. This i~ beeause there was no conl-
mitment by Stoek to participate in these expenses 
prior to ,July of 1948 at Vt'"hich ti1ne Stock made his 
deal for a nev.-r interest as discussed above. 
The trial court opinion com1nents upon this as fol-
lows: · • If Stock himself had expended any money for 
develop1nent since the action 'vas filed (which the 
record does not specifically indicate) he, along with all 
other parties to this · action, dealt with the property 
subject to the exigencies of this action and may not 
assert such expenditures as a change of position upon 
which to base an estoppel" (Emphasis added). 
The following statement from 31 Corp. Jur. Sec. 
p. 267, par. 71, is sufficient to illustrate the well-
established legal principles which dispose of the point: 
''It is an essential element of equitable estoppel 
that the person invoking it has been influenced· by, 
and has relied on, the representation or conduct of 
8It is not material to Meagher's point whether the Stoek-Juhan 
deal in 1948 did or did not give Stock an interest solely traceable 
to the Phebus line of title. Meagher's point is that such is 
Stock's explanation of that deal. If that was his intention ,and 
he claims it 'vas, he could not possibly have been motivated by 
any belief that Meagher had given up. Therefore, there was no 
action taken hy Stock in reliance upon anything attributable to 
Meagher. 
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the person sought to be f•stopped * * • The person 
asserting the estoppel n1ust have been actually nlis-
led to his injury, by the acts, conduct, words, or 
silence of the person claiming to be estopped. There 
can be no equitable estoppel where the complain-
ant's act appears to be rather the result of his 
own wil1 or judgment than the product of what 
defendant did or represented. The act must be in-
duced by, and be the immediate or proximate re-
sult of, the conduct or representation, which 1nust 
be such as the party claiming the estoppel had a 
right to rely on. The representation or conduct 
must of itself have been sufficient to warrant the 
action of the party claiming the estoppel.'' 
Finding of Fact No. 36 deals with the factual phase 
of this issue, as follows : ''No action, lack of action, 
or change of position by any defendant was induced 
by or undertaken in reliance upon any action, , in-
action, or representation, express or implied, attri-
butable to Meagher; nor did any defendant take or 
refrain from taking any action due to any misconcep-
tion of fact or of law." 
The following portion of Finding of Fact No. 37 
is also in point: "Neither said drilling operations nor 
any expenditures incurred in connection therewith 
were induced by ·or were undertaken in reliance upon 
any representation, express or in1plied, attributable to 
Meagher. Stock and all other parties to this action 
dealt with the property .subject to the exigencies of 
this litigation and with full knowledge that Meagher 
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asserted infer~sts substantially 111 conflict with the 
rlahns of each defendant." 
Conclusion of La"· No. 15 rorreetly states: '' ~teagher 
is neither estopped nor barred by laches from asserting 
the interests to "·hirh he is entitled as herein set 
forth.'' 
4. MEA·GBER IS GUILTY OF NO FRAUDULENT 
CONDUCT WHATSOEVER. 
Appellants devote separate sections of their brief to 
clanns of mistake and lack of consideration. But in 
their argun1ent under the serious charge of fraud, 
· these other issues are literally brought in by the heels, 
Recognizing this they say, ''whether it be called fraud 
or 1nistake is of little consequence, the result is the 
san1e.'' The same argument could be urged to dis-
tinguish murder fron1 an accidental killing, but the 
legal consequences are different. 
We agree that the result is the same In the sense 
that either fraud or actionable mistake gives rise to 
the clahn of rescission. In both situations that claim 
can be lost by a party who, being fully a"\vare of his 
claim, conceals his decision to assert it, lets years 
elapse and withholds any action until great changes in 
the value of the property have occurred. However, the 
foregoing considerations are in the nature of confession 
and avoidanee and are asserted by Meagher in Section 
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10 of this argument. At this· point Meagher will demon-
strate there was no fraud.9 
The charge of fraud is a serious accusation. Its 
eletnents are substantially identical with those of de-
ceit. It jnvolves an intentional over-reaching of one 
party b~· another. The motives of the fraudulent party 
are of great in1portance. His acts rnust have been 
conunitted with the intention of deceiving the other 
party and leading him into a prejudicial position. The 
party defrauded must have been fooled. He must have 
relied upon the deceptive activities of the fraudulent 
one. 
The cases reciting the elements of fraud are legion. 
However, there is no substantial variation in the doc~ 
trine as applied in the various states. The elements 
are set forth as follows in 37 C.J.S., page 215: 
''Comprehensively stated, the elements of ac-
tionable fraud consist of: (1) representation; (2) 
its falsity; ( 3) its materiality; ( 4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; 
( 5) his intent that it should be acted on by the 
person and in the n1anner reasonably contem-
plated; ( 6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his right to rely 
thereon; and (9) his consequent and proximate 
injury.'' 
These are elementary principles. They are well 
known to appellants. But they do not care to grapple 
9Section 5 is devoted to the issue of consideration. Section 6 
argues the issue of mistake. 
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,vith the hurden "·hieh these essential elen1ents hupose 
upon one n1aking the grave eharge of fraud. lnstead, 
they n1erely eonfuse the issues hoping this court can 
be induced to forget the 1nany ronditions which one 
n1ust mPet before a eourt 'vill brand a litigant with 
the ~ tign1a of being a cheat. 
When the fraud section of the appellants' brief is 
analyzed it~ factual foundation boils down to this: 
Stock o\vned an undivided 'l2 of the lessee's rights in 
lands o\vned by ~Ieagher. For a period of 15 years 
Stock and his co-lessee had done nothing about it or 
at least their efforts to develop the property had ac-
coinplished nothing. ~Ieagher 'vrote to Stock on Jan-
uary 7, 1944 (.A-26), telling him: (1) Meagher had 
purchased the landowner's rights subject to outstand-
ing royal ties and the lease; ( 2) Meagher understood 
that Stock and Phebus had assigned all their rights 
to one Archie Le,vis but finds no record of that as-
signment. (3) l\Ieagher's objective is to clear the title 
of the lease because the record instruments indicate 
that Stock i~ still interested; ( 4) Meagher requests a 
release from Stock. 
Ten days later a letter was written to Meagher by 
L. J. I-Iinkley on behalf of Stock (A-32) acknowledging 
Meagher's letter of January 7. This letter advises that 
Stock will execute an instrument to clear the out-
:-;tanding royalties on the lease which ~'will enable you 
to record sa1ne and clear the title.'' This letter does 
indicate some confusion, at least in the mind of Mr. 
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Hinkley, for it discusses royalties whereas Meagher's 
letter ( A-26) does not diRcuss royalties but states 
that Meagher's efforts are designed to ''clear the 
title of the lease." 
The next communication between Stock and Meagher 
comes nine months later and is the letter of October 
16, 1944 to Paul Stock (A-27), signed by Meagher's 
daughter acting as Meagher's attorney. This letter says: 
''As attorney for my father, Mr. N. J. Meagher, I have 
started a quiet title suit in the District Court of 
Uintah County, but I have been assured that you do 
not claim any interest of any sort in the Ashley Valley 
Oil field and will sign a release of any interests you 
had in the past so the release may be recorded.'' 
The next step in the Stock-Meagher communications 
was the receipt by Meagher from Stock of the release 
which Meagher's daughter had enclosed in her letter 
of October 16. 
Note the long interval of tin1e (nine months) be-
tween Hinkley's letter to Meagher and Katherine 
Meagher's letter to Stock. Note the positive manner 
in which Katherine Meagher excluded any possible 
inf·erence that her father was merely talking about 
outstanding royalties. If there was any question in 
Stock's mind as to what Meagher was talking about 
after the Hinkley letter it was certainly ·clarified by 
l{atherine Meagher's letter. 
It is significant that appellants' brief combines the 
letters to Phebus with the Stock correspondence. There 
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is nothing in the record to indiea te that staten1ents 
1nade to Phebus by l\{eagher \vere ever ~ommunicated 
to Stock. In fact, the contrary is indicated by 
Hinkley·~ letter 'vhich states that Phebus is not in 
dthis part of the eonntry" and advises that "his ad-
dress is so1newhere in Illinois.'' 
Even though "~e find nothing In the letters to 
Phebus "~hirh if addressed to Stock 'vould in any way 
confuse Stock a~ to ~feagher'~ intentions, we consider 
it in1proper to discuss the Phebus letters in con-
nection \vith claimed fraud upon Stock. Our real ob-
jection in this respect is that it tends to telescope the 
correspondence chronologically and thereby creates an 
erroneous in1pression. There were only two exchanges 
of correspondence bet,veen Stock and ~ieagher. One 
occurred in ,January of 1944, the other in October 
of that year. 
However, we can cite one of the Phebus letters to 
illustrate the open 1nanner in which Meagher was 
treating the 1natter 'vhen he -vvas atteinpting to clear 
up his title. In this connection see Meagher's letter 
of November 9, 1944 to Phebus (A-28) which frankly 
concedes that ~1eagher has been solicited for a lease 
on the property and assigns this as a reason for 
wishing to get releases from Phebus and Stock. This 
is not the type of disclosure made by one who is 
deceitfully scheming to cheat another out of oil rights. 
Appellants cite the testimony elicited from Stock 
at the trial to indicate that Stock only thought he was 
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clearing up the landowner's royalty situation when he 
executed the release to Meagher. However, if such had 
been the fact, after discovering the discrepancy would 
not Stock have brought this to Meagher's attention~ 
Particularly is this true in the face of 1\ieagher's letter 
to Stock written J nne 18, 1945, a few months after Stock 
executed and delivered his release. In that letter 
~ieagher asked Stock why he had given a quitclaim to 
Hill and pointed out specifically how this transfer to 
Hill would be likely to confuse the title. Certainly at 
that time if Stock's release to Meagher had been given 
under the misapprehension that he was merely re-
leasing the royalties, Stock would have promptly said 
so 'vhen Meagher himself brought up the subject. 
But, as noted . above, Stock did not even deign to reply 
to Meagher's letter of June 18, 1945 (A-39) even 
though at that time he had already entered into his 
plan with Juhan to upset the release he had given to 
Meagher. 
The fact 1s that Stock labored under no mis-
apprehension. The trial court has declined to accept 
this, the one and only excuse Stock gives for avoiding 
his own document. The opinion says that Stock's counsel 
seeks to attribute to Stock ''an innocence which his wide 
experjence and manifest sagacity do not support". 
The opinion also states that notwithstanding Stock's 
testimony that he 1nerely glanced at Katherine Meag-
her's letter and merely ''glanced over the release it-
self", he could not have misunderstood their import 
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·'unless he "·ns possessed of t hP innorPnee which he 
~eeks to have the rourt belieYe he \Va~.'' The opinion 
also points out thnt ''since Stock had no interest in 
the gas rig·hts * * * and had done nothing. at all 
with respect to hi~ oil rights, it would be easy to 
understand his ~elf-asserted disregard of the contents 
of these instrlnnents even assun1ing it to be true that 
he paid slight attention to then1. The opinion goes on 
·'but in either event it hardly comes with the best of 
grace now after the discovery of oil and in considera-
tion of his implication as to the \veakness of his clairn 
expressed in A-19, for him to say that what he 
thought he "-as releasing was merely a royalty In-
terest, and that he did not in tend to surrender his 
n1ineral rights in the property.' '10 
Appellants rnay not thus avoid the real significance 
of Stock's testimony. The hnportance of the testi-
lnony quoted on pages 56 and 57 of appellants' brief 
is that it proves that when Stock executed the release 
to 1'Ieagher, he was not relying upon any represen-
tat-ions utade by Meagher and was not misled by 
any contrary to fact recitals contained in the release 
itself. This point 'vill be discussed further in Sec-
tion 6 which pertains to mistake. 
10In speaking of Stock's "implication as to the weakness of 
his claim'' the court refers to the Stock-Hill-Juhan deal whereby 
Stock transferred what he had to Juhan (via Hill) for one-
eighth of what Juhan could make of it in litigation with 
~Ieagher. One does not assign away a valued interest in con-
sideration for getting one-eighth of it back. 
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We agree that on the issue of fraud Meagher's 
state of tnind is material and .so is Stock's. We defy 
eounsel to point out any representation made by 
1\feagher to Stock or anyone else which was contrary 
to fact and known by Meagher to be so. We further 
ehallenge appellants to show any action taken by Stock 
which was taken in reliance upon any representation, 
action or inaction of Meagher's. 
As in the section on estoppel, appellants have cited 
a number of sound authorities setting forth principles 
· with which we have no dispute. Our quarrel with 
them lies in their effort to bring the facts of 
this case within those authorities. It certainly is not 
fraud for a landowner to ask the tenants of an old 
oil lease to release their interests. And when such 
landowner ·only succeeds in obtaining such release 
from the owner of an undivided one-half of the lessee's 
rights, it certainly is not fraud for that landowner to 
pursue the rights which flow to him by virtue of 
that conveyance. 
The issue has been correctly determined by the trial 
court. Finding No. 38 expressly meets the claim of 
fraud and determines that Meagher was not guilty 
of fraudulent or deceitful conduct with respect to Stock, 
or any other party to this action. 
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5. THE STOCK TO MEAGHER TRANSFER IS SUPP·ORTED 
BY A LEGAL CONSIDERATION. 
This ~eetion of appellant~' brief attacks Finding 
of Faet ~o. -t-2 '''"hieh stntes that the Stock to Meagher 
transfer is supported by consideration in that Stock 
was thereby excused fron1 further performance of his 
obligations under the lease. 
Appellant~ charge that no one has pointed out 
what obligations existed w·hich Stock was bound to 
perform as the o'vner of one-half of the lessee's rights. 
Surely this cannot be asserted seriously. We have 
never seen a lease devoid of obligations on the part 
of the lessee and this one is no exception. A mere 
casual reference to the lease ( A-1) and its modifica-
tion (A -5) 'vill reveal obligations of the lessee in 
nearly every section. See e.g. sections 5, ·6, 7 and 14 of 
Exhibit A-5. 
Appellants say that ~feagher could not relinquish 
a portion of perforn1ance any more than Stock could 
relinquish a portion of the lease. This statement is 
confusing. The answer is that Stock n1ost certainly 
could transfer 'vhatever interests he had to Meagher 
and in consideration therefor Meagher could relieve 
Stock fro1n any responsibility he had as a co-lessee. 
This is just what occurred and Stock, therefore, did 
receive a benefit which constitutes full legal considera-
tion to support the transfer. 
If Phebus had acceded to Meagher's request and 
had exeeuted a transfer of his interest as did Stock, 
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an lessees' rights and obligations would thereby have 
been extinguished. As it was, since Phebus did not 
release, the lease was not extinguished but Stock's 
interest had passed to Meagher and Stock's obligations 
thereunder to Meagher were extinguished. 
Appellants seem to argue that a landowner can never 
gather up outstanding leasehold rights when there 
is more than one lessee unless he obtains a release 
from all of the co-tenants. This, of course, is nonsense 
and particularly so in the case of oil leases which 
are frequently divided into numerous undivided in-
terests. 
It is true that Meagher considered the lease to be a 
nullity at the time he asked for the release. On the 
other hand, the record discloses that Meagher did con-
sider that the property still had oil prospects as shown 
in his letter to Phebus of Nove1nber 9, 1944 (A-28), in 
"
7hich he frankly stated that other parties were trying 
to lease the land from hi1n. Thus it appears that 
~leagher fully intended to do what he could to develop 
the property. Naturally if those efforts were success-
ful, the value of the right to expore for and produce 
oil would go froln a nominal to a substantial value. 
But · Meagher 1nade no effort to conceal this from 
Phebus or fro1n Stock and the question of adequacy 
of consideration to support the release is not affected 
by calculations of its value based upon developments 
conducted years later. 
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"\Vhen the release was requested 1\leagher sincerely 
believed that Stock and J>hebus had no lawful rights. 
Stock "·as indifferent, but he did e(nne to the reasonable 
conclusion that after holding onto this property for 15 
years and having been unable to do anything with it, it 
'vas high tin1e that he release it baek to the landowner. 
This is ju~t what Standard Oil Compan~r of Cali-
fornia and its subsidiary did for Stock and Phebus 
after they took a lease and decided not to develop it. 
These con1panies were not in default when they re-
leased . .._·\Jthough the record is silent on the point, the 
circumstances of the transaction are such that we 
confidently assert that Stock and Phebus paid nothing 
to the California Company for its release back to 
the1n. If the argument claiming inadequacy of con-
sideration has merit, the California Company could 
no'v claim that its release to Stock and Phebus is 
voidable. Such a contention \vould also be nonsense. 
On the subject of adequacy of consideration, appel-
lants go to the extre1ne in clutching at straws. Where 
adequacy of consideration is relevant, the inquiry is 
always lhnited to the fair value of the subject matter 
of the transfer considered at the time it is made. In-
adequacy of consideration cases are closely related to 
fraud and usually involve over-reaching of an ignorant 
person by one possessed of superior information. On 
the subject of superior information, do appellants con-
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tend that Meagher knew when he as~ed for this release 
that the property overlay an oil field~ The values 
which appellants urge to establish the inadequacy are 
predicated upon oil sales commencing in September 
of 1948. The transaction which is attacked for inade-
quacy occurred in October of 1944. 
Thus, regardless of whether Stock was under a 
contractual duty to release or was voluntarily turning 
back his lessees' rights, the fact remains that he did 
make the transfer and did thereby cease to have any 
obligations as a lessee. These facts alone dispose of 
the issue of consideration. 
Barker v. Smythe ('Vyo. 1944), 143 Pac. (2d) 
565; 
Exeter Co. v. Santuel Martin, Ltd. (Wash. 1940) 
105 Pac. (2d) 83; 
Hallam v. Commercial Mining &; Realty Co. 
( C.C.A. 10, 1931), 49 Fed. ( 2d) 103, cert. 
den. ; 284 U. S. 643. 
It is not necessary to support Meagher's position 
but an additional element of consideration can be 
found in the facts. It will be noted that the quiet title 
suit was comn1enced on October 17, 1944 immediately 
after Katherine Meagher had written to Stock asking 
for his release. Stock was named as a party in the 
action but since he was a nonresident, service by pub-
lication was required to obtain jurisdiction. However, 
the requested release from Stock was executed Oc-
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tober 21 .. 1944. __ At no titue \\·as service on Stock per-
fected, and hi~ first appearance 1n the action on 
August 17. 1.949 'vas purely Yoluntary. Thus ~t[eagher 
forbore prosecution of his suit against Stock in con-
sideration for the release Stock had given him. In 
fact, if ~Ieagher had later sought to bring Stock into 
the suit, Stock could certainly have urged his release 
as a basis for obtaining a sunnnary dismissal. 
''r e kno"~ of no case "1'here a lessee under an oil 
and gas lea~e 'vho has released his interest to the 
landowner has been able to repudiate his release on 
the basis of lack or inadequacy of consideration. And 
where, as here, discovery of oil intervenes between 
execution of the release and the effort to rescind it, 
no such case can ever arise. 
6. THE STOCK TO MEAGHER TRANSFER MAY NOT BE 
RESCINDED ON THE GROUND OF MISTAKE. 
This section of appellants' brief goes to great lengths 
to avoid the use of the term ''rescission''. This omis-
sion is not inadvertent. The obvious purpose of our 
able adversaries is to divert this court's attention from 
the fact that the plea of mistake, like fraud, lack of 
consideration, and estoppel goes to the question of 
whether Stock can rescind the instrun1ent he signed. 
This, of course, inllilediately brings to mind the 
1nany affir1native duties which are hnposed upon one 
who seeks res~ission, practically all of which have been 
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ignored by Stock. These will be discussed in Section 
10, infra. We now turn to the question of whether a 
1 nistake was made of a character which will support 
. . 
resciss1on even if Stock could meet the conditions 
precedent to exercising this right. 
We frankly state that Meagher was under a mis-
apprehension with respect to his legal rights at the 
tin1e he asked Stock to release his interest. Meagher 
thought the lease had been forfeited or at least had 
been abandoned. He frankly said so. But Stock did 
not share this misapprehension. Although the doctrine 
of rescission for mistake has many ramifications, one 
element exists in all the cases, that is : the party 
aggrieved n1ust have participated in the error. That 
element is lacking here and we prove it by the testi-
mony of Stock himself.11 
11Even if Stock had joined in Meagher's error, the mistake 
·would not constitute grounds for rescission because of Stock's 
negligence and indifference. 
See Fraters G & P Co. v. Southwestern C Co. (1930), 107 
Cal. App. 1, · 290 Pac. 45, which states: · 
"The purden is on one who relies upon iraud or mistalte 
as grounds for the rescission or revision of an instrument 
to allege and prove the essential elements of the charge. 
* * * Courts of equity will not encourage the cancellation 
or revision of instruments on the ground of mistake where 
they appear to\ have been executed by the cmnplainant 
without the exercise of reasonable care. '' 
See also: Moreno jfut. lrr. Co. v. Beauntont Irr. Dist. (1949), 
94 Cal. App. (2d) 766, 211 Pac. (2d) 928, which states: 
"Moreover, mere ignorance of the facts is not necessarily 
a ground for relief nor will the courts relieve one from the 
consequences of his own improvidence or poor judgment. 
Parties must exercise ordinary diligence * * * and may not 
avoid a contract on the basis of mistake where it appears 
that ignorance of the facts was the result of carelessness, 
indifference or inattention. '' 
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.Appellants say: '~In light of all the circun1stances 
it is elearly evident that Stoek \vas 1nistaken as to 
the contractual obligation to relea~e as to Meagher.'' 
This "·e en1phntieally dispute. The record offers circum-
stantial eYidenee in support of this statement except 
for the fact that Stock ·s ou;n testirnony precludes it. 
He was directly asked what he had in mind when he 
signed the relea8e. This question gave him a fair 
opportunity to support the elahn of mistake contained 
in his pleading. But to the credit of our adversaries, 
\Ve can :5ay that Stock \Vas not coached. He made no 
effort \vha tsoever to clain1 that he signed the release 
because he thought he was legally obliged to or because 
he had placed any reliance in ~1eagher's contention 
that he, Stock, had no remaining rights. On the con-
trary, he adn1itted that he only glanced at the docu-
n1ent. He made no claim that he was misled by the 
contrary to fact (or law) recitals contained therein. He 
admitted that he only glanced at Katherine Meagher's 
letter. He 1nade no clain1 that he was n1istaken with 
respect to his legal rights. In fact, he admitted that 
he had not even read the pleading which had been filed 
in his behalf. 
The only explanation Stock made upon which any-
one could predicate an attack upon the release was 
· · that he thought he was transferring back to Meagher 
certain royaltie~. But there is a limit to what mis-
takes 'vill support a rescission. One cannot make a mis-
take so flagrant, so irresponsible as the only one Stock 
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suggested in his testimony and still avoid responsi-
bility therefor. There was nothing in any correspond-
enee from Meagher to indicate that he was limiting 
hi R request to a transfer of royalties. The subject of 
royalties was injected into the correspondence by 
Stock's rnan IIinkley nine months prior to the letter 
K.a therine Meagher sent to Stock. Her letter enclosed 
the release and is the letter Stock acted upon. Her 
letter said nothing about royalties and expressed the 
request for a release in such clear and direct language 
that no one could have misunderstood her intent. The 
only explanation Stock assigned as his reason for 
avoiding the release was not acceptable to the trial 
court. The trial judge saw and heard the witness. 
Stock offered no other explanation. Even if Stock's 
testimony had been acceptable to the court, the best 
situation appellants could present would involve mis-
takes of both parties relating to different matters. This 
situation will not support rescission. The rule is stated 
in Restatement, Contracts, Section 503, as follows: 
''A mistake of only one party that forms the basis 
on which he enters into a transaction does not of 
itself render the transaction voidable; nor do nlis-
takes of both parties if the respective mistakes 
relate to different matters * * *" 
Nor can appellants suggest that Stock was ignorant 
of the ways of handling oil interests. The trial judge 
refers to Stock as a man of ''wide experience and 
manifest sagacity.'' In this regard note that Stock 
had been in the oil business for many years and by 
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the end of 19+-t. had dealt extensively \vith oil leases 
and royalties and oil intere~ts of all kinds. In fact 
during 1934 he sold a substantial part of his oil in-
terests to The Texas Con1pany in n deal involving· 
millions. This is not the type of individual who is 
likely to 111ake a 1uis take in the release of an oil in-
terest. .... \nd if he had n1ade the n1istake suggested by 
his counsel he \Yould not forget it when asked the 
outright question as to \\.,.hat \Vas in his 1nind when 
he signed the release. 
V\r e have ~tated to the trial court and we say again 
here that our comn1ents with respect to Stock's frame 
of Inind and his failure to read his own pleadings. 
are not to be understood as insinuating improper con-
duct on the part of opposing counsel. The documents 
of record do present eircun1stantial evidence indicating 
the possibility of estoppel or mistake. But the actual 
testi1nony of Stock with respect to his own state of 
mind first at the time he executed the release and second 
at the time he bought into the deal in 1948, refutes 
the circumstantial inferences beyond a doubt. 
The true facts with respect to the issue of mis-
take are these: 1leagher made a mistake and thought 
his legal position was stronger than it actually was. 
He cannot be blamed for this misapprehension for 
his position was confirn1ed by a· trial court and it was 
not until that decision had been reversed by this 
court that ~feagher knew he was wrong. Meagher 
may have presented his misapprehension to Stock in 
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~uch a manner that Stock could have joined in 
Meagher's mistake of law. Conceivably Stock might 
have relied upon Meagher's erroneous presentation of 
the situation in such a manner as to permit him to 
rescind his own instrument. But the facts, disclosed 
from the mouth of Stock hirnself, establish that no 
such error motivated any of Stock's actions. 
On the face of it, it would appear that Stock was 
grossly negligent. However, we suggest that this is 
not the true explanation. The real reason why Stock re-
leased to ~Ieagher is because he was finished with the 
Ashley Valley Oil structure. He had been interested 
for 15 years. The best he was able to do was to get 
Standard to take over the lease. Standard held it 
for 3 years and turned it back. Stock figured it was 
''a dead play'' to use the language of oil men like 
appellants. When the letter from Katherine Meagher 
came in the fall of 1944 Stock knew it was a request 
from a patient landowner to release the property in 
order to give him a chance to do something with ·it 
himself. That is what Stock did. Actually Stock wasn't 
interested in the legal status of the lease. He was 
through with it. 
There is no factual or legal basis for rescission here 
predicated upon mistake of law or fact or otherwise. 
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7. THE STOCK TO MEAGHER TRANSFER, VIEWED AS A 
SURRENDER, IS A VALID RELINQUISHMENT OF STOCK'S 
INTEREST IN THE LEASE TO MEAGHER. 
.A.ppellants object to the use of the \vord ''transfer'' 
which is en1ployed in the findings to describe the legal 
effect of }:xhibit ~\-30. 
The trial court'~ first opinion reached conclusions 
which \Vould logically and properly follow fro1n an 
interpretation of the docu1nent as a ''surrender''. 
However, those conelusions were inconsistent with the 
stipulation made in court by Meagher 'vhich foreclosed 
any contention that ~{eagher was making an effort to 
attack the overriding royalty 'vhich defendant Ashley 
,r alley Oil Con1pany had acquired. The trial court's 
analysis yielded a smaller interest for all appellants 
than 'vas conceded by the stipulation. However, Meag-
her was bound by his stipulation and promptly 
pointed out the situation to the trial court. The find-
ings cleared up the n1a tter and the trial court filed 
a supplemental opinion explaining that regardless of 
\vhether the transfer be vie\ved as a ''surrender'' or 
as a "conveyance" it was a transfer sufficient to pass 
fron1 Stock to ~Ieagher 'vhatever lessee's rights Stock 
had in the leasehold. 
The findings of fact were adopted by the court 
only after objections were filed and argument thereon. 
Of course, the findings are not to be modified or sup-
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planted by remarks of the court in discussing the 
decision. 
Pender v. Anderson (September 11, 1951, 235 
Pac. (2d) 360; 
Christen~~en v. Nielsen, 73 Utah 603, 276 Pac. 
645. 
But the above rule need not be invoked by Meagher 
because the trial court's supplen1ental opinion cor-
rected the oversight, so there is no inconsistency to 
explain. 
:hioreover, the result finally reached in the findings, 
conclusions and decree varied from the original opinion 
only by increasing the amount of overriding royalty 
adjudicated to Stock and Juhan as well as to .... t\.shley 
Valley Oil Company. The decree awards 4% to Ashley 
in lieu of 2%; 1% to Juhan in lieu of ¥2'%; and Stock 
received 1% in lieu of~%. Thus appellants here seek 
to make capital of the fact that the findings and decree 
give them more than the original opinion, and this 
even though it was Meagher who voluntarily brought 
the prior stipulation to the attention of the trial 
court. 
Actually, the Stock to Meagher transfer is really 
a quitclaim12 and as such is both a "surrender" and a 
''conveyance''. 
12Jn Section 8 we discuss the granting clause of the document 
and demonstrate that it is a valid quitclaim deed. 
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Since Rertion 7 of appellants' brief elects to attack 
the transfer H8 a ~urrender~ 've 'vill no'v seek to tneet 
those argutnents. 
(a.) The transfer is not affected by the provisions of Exhibit 
A-5, the modification of the lease. 
First. appellants argue that the surrender was not 
1nade in the utanner prescribed by the tnodification 
agree1uent~ ..~:\-5, 'vhich changed many of the terms 
of the original lease, .. A .. -1. We answer: First, this 
is not an accurate interpretation of the 1nodification 
agreen1ent; second, a surrender consented to by both 
lessor and lessee supersedes any provisions in the 
lease concerning surrender. 
Defendants argue that paragraphs 20 and 28 of the 
modification agreement set forth the method and pre-
scribe the conditions under which a surrender n1ay 
be given, and urge that the Stock-to-Meagher sur-
render (.A.-30) is ineffective in that it was executed 
in a different n1anner than contemplated in the cited 
paragraphs of the 1nodification agreement. 
1ieagher replies that the provisions of the modi-
fication agreement concerning surrender refer to the 
lessees' right to surrender, regardless of the desires 
of the lessor. Surrender is not always desirable fron1 
the lessor's point of view, and for this reason condi-
tion~ were properly included In the agreement to 
specify the tern1s under which the lessee can force a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
60 
surrender upon the lessor. This has no bearing upon 
the right of the lessor and lessee to negotiate a sur-
render by 1nutual consent, which is always inherent in 
any leasehold. 
Meagher concedes that the provisions of the modi-
fication agree1nent are such that Ashley's rights to 
an overriding royalty 1nust be protected. But there 
has. been no atternpt in this litigation to curtail Ash-
ley's rights to this royalty, and what Stock could 
surrender he did surrender, narn.ely, his one-half in-
terest in the lease. 
Everything in paragraphs 20 and 28 of the modi-
fication agreement is designed to define the conditions 
upon which the lessee may, as a matter of right, ''be 
relieved and released of all obligations'' under the 
lease. There is nothing in the provisions of the 
agreen1ent which precludes the lessor and one or more 
lessees from agreeing to a surrender on other or dif-
ferent terms than those specified in the agreement 
so long as the . rights of third parties are not 
prejudiced. 
Furthermore, the possibility that a surrender might 
be effected. in some manner other than those specified 
in paragraph 20 is recognized in paragraph 26 of the 
1nodification agreement, which provides (emphasis 
ours): 
''Notwithstanding . anything in this lease pro-
vided or contained to the contrary, it is hereby 
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expressly agreed by the lessee tha .. t ·in the event of, 
and at all thnes frotn and after, the forfeiture, 
cancellation. .-:nr·render and/or other termination 
for any ca.use u~hatsoerer, of the lessee's right 
to drill, prospect and 1 O't prod~uce oil upon the 
lands the subject of this agreen1en t, then the les-
sors, their respective heirs, legal representatives, 
andjor assigns shall have, and the lessee hereby 
grants unto the1n, reciprocal rights of possession 
and control of, and all necessary rights-of-way 
• * * for the purpose of prospecting, drilling 
for, * * * all oil contained in or produced from; 
• * * it being the understanding and intent of 
the parties hereto that in the event of the sur-
render or other terminating of lessee's said such 
oil rights, the lessee shall thereafter exercise his 
rights to operate and develop for gas upon the 
lands the subject of this agreement in a manner 
consistent with the reciprocal rights of the lessors 
to operate said lands for oils. * * *" 
The foregoing paragraph is important not only as 
a recognition that there might be a surrender in a 
manner different from that contemplated elsewhere in 
the modification agreement, but it also demonstrates 
the proposition that Stock's surrender to Meagher is 
adequate to pass Stock's right to prospect for oil, 
even though Stock was divested of the right to de-
velop for gas. 
Anticipating the above arguments, appellants then 
say that where lessor and lessee consent to a sur-
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render in a manner different from that provided in 
the lease, ''the consent of the lessor must be shown.'' 
We submit that acceptance of the transfer, recording 
it and relying upon it in subsequent litigation, eVI-
dences Meagher's consent beyond question. 
(b) The transfer does not lack consideration. 
Next appellants say that the transfer- wants con-
sideration when viewed as a surrender. The question 
of consideration has been fully discussed in Section 5, 
s~tpra, and the argument therein is fully applicable 
here. 
(c) Stock was fully empowered to surrender to the rever-
sioner Meagher whatever interest he had in the leasehold. 
Appellants' next point is the assertion that Stock 
did not have the power to surrender his interest in 
the lease. Meagher concedes that Stock and Stock 
and Meagher together could not contract in such a 
manner as to cut off the rights of any other party 
having an interest in the lessee's rights under the 
lease. But no such effect resulted under this transfer. 
Appellants' entire argun1ent at this point is predicated 
upon hypothetical damage to Ashley Valley Oil Com-
pany but not to appellants Stock, Juhan, or Phebus. 
Ashley Valley Oil Con1pany has filed its own appeal 
in this case. It charges no error with respect to any 
rights it might have in the 440-acre parcel. That parcel 
is the only property involved in the dispute between 
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1[eagher and appellant~ tluhan, Stock and Phebus. Yet 
it is the hypothetical rights of Ashley Valley Oil 
Co1npa11y, not their o'vn, 'vhich these appellants now 
urge. The explanation of this situation lies in the 
fact that :J[eag-her 8tipulated in open court that he 
did not attack the overriding royalty interests of 
.A.shley \""alley Oil Co1npany. Thus any contractual 
provision8 designed to protect those interests were 
not affected by the transfer from Stock. This stipula-
tion was fully kept. The decree awards Ashley every-
thing Ashley rlain1ed so far as concerns the 440-acre 
parcel. Obviously, a lessee can surrender what he has 
to his lessor so long as no injury is thereby sustained 
by other parties in interest. Meagher claims no dif-
ferent result fron1 this. Ashley Valley Oil Company 
makes no complaint. The other appellants are not con-
cerned. 
(d) Meagher was the owner of the reversionary rights in the 
property and as such was eligible to receive a surrender. 
Finally in attacking the effect of the transfer, viewed 
as a surrender, appellants claim that Meagher was 
not the reversioner. In fact, appellants claim the re-
versionary rights themselves by virtue of a deed to 
J1Jd\vard F. Richards, one of the attorneys for appel-
lants, which was obtained Septe1nber 14, 1948 (A-61), 
fro1n one Johnson who, acting for appellants, obtained 
a deed from the heirs of M. P. Smith on September 
11, 194R (A-60). Appellants concede that if Edward 
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F. Richards obtained any interest by virtue of these 
deeds he holds for the benefit of appellants. It is 
noteworthy that appellants did not consider these 
belated transactions worthy of inclusion in their own 
chart of the title (A-62), 'vhich is reproduced in their 
brief.13 Meagher also considers these transactions to 
be irrelevant and omitted them from his chart (A-57). 
But to return to the question of Meagher's rever-
sionary rights: It was agreed at pre-trial that the 
question of reversion depends upon construction of 
the deeds 1\II. P. Smith gave to Meagher as to an 
{ 
undivided four-fifths interest (A-7) and to Meagher's 
grantor, Alexander, as to the remaining undivided 
one-fifth (A-8). The question is whether these deeds 
passed only surface rights to the grantees or also 
passed the reversionary oil and gas rights which Smith 
held as lessor. 
By ''reversionary rights'' in this case we mean the 
rights remaining in the owner of the fee after he has 
leased his property for oil and gas development. Such 
reversionary rights could be termed "lessor's rights". 
Possibly a helpful way to analyze the location of 
the reversionary or lessor's rights in the oil and gas 
estate is to follow each transaction and see where the 
reversion vested thereafter. 
13These two deeds were procured by appellants' attorney within 
less than a week prior to discovery of oil. The record is silent as 
to the consideration paid to the widow and children of M. P. 
Smith. 
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\Ye ~tart 'vith Sheridan, the fee o'vner prior to 
execution of any lease, at 'vhich thne Sheridan, of 
course, owned the entire oil and gas estate. 
Then Sheridan exeeuted the original lease to R. C. 
Hill C:\.-1). It 'v'ill be undisputed that Sheridan was 
the lessor, and, as ~uch, retained the reversionary 
or lessor's rights. 
Then Sheridan eonveyed his entire interest to Smith 
{A-4). It i~ undisputed that Smith thereby acquired 
the oil and g-a~ estate ~ubject to the leasehold, and, as 
such, became the reversioner. 
Then S1nith executed a number of assignments of 
royalty (the one to Meagher is Ex. A-46, and all of 
these assignments are enumerated in A-7). These as-
signments of royalty did not pass any reversionary 
or lessor's rights to the various assignees. They 
merely assigned the value of certain specified pro-
portions of ultimate production from the property. 
Then Smith entered into the· modification agreement 
with Ashley Valley Oil Co. (A-5). This, however, is 
nothing more than what it purports to be, namely, a 
modification of the terms of the original lease. While 
it is true that this modification agreement converted 
an ordinary lease into one much more onerous on the 
lessor, it would be the height of presumption to con-
tend that Smith thereby lost the remainder of his oil 
and gas estate. The 1nodification agreement contains no 
provisions indicating an intent to eliminate Smith 
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from the chain of title to the oil and gas estate and, on 
the contrary, provides: (1) that Smith succeeded to 
the rights of the Sheridans, the lessors, (2) that certain 
paragraphs of the lease are superceded by specific sub-
stitute paragraphs, (3) that the parties be designated 
as "lessor" and "lessee", ( 4) that the lease be for-
feited to . Smith if specified events of default should 
occur, and (5) that Smith is the proper party to who1n 
surrender shall be made if and when surrender if; 
made. 
Bearing In mind that all owners of royalties sub-
scribed to the modification agreement, the express rec-
ognition of Smith as the lessor or reversioner would 
seem conclusive on three points: (1) there were re-
versionary rights in existence after execution of the 
modification agreement, (2) Smith was the reversioner, 
and (3) the royalty owners had no reversionary rights. 
Si~ce Smith obtained these reversionary or lessor's 
rights from Sheridan and did not transfer then1 to 
anyone else until he conveyed to Meagher, the entire 
issue with respect to the location of reversionary rights 
depends upon construction of the transfers fron1 Smith 
to Meagher as to an undivided four-fifths (A-7), and 
from Smith to Alexander as to an undivided one-fifth 
(A-8). Since these documents are substantially identiral, 
an analysis of A-7 ~hould be sufficient. 
This deed says that Smith, for a valuable consider-
ation, quitclaims an undivided four-fifths interest in 
the land to Meagher, excepting and reserVIng all the 
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rights in the land and in the oil and gas which have 
been sold or disposed of by the S1niths or their grantors 
under the following instrun1ents to which this grant is 
subject: 
(a) The Sheridan lease; 
(b) to (h), inclusive. Various assignments of land-
owner's royalty; 
(i)" The modific.ation agreement of May 21, 1926 
(A-5). 
The deed further states that Meagher assumes and 
agrees to pay and to perform the obligations of Smith 
under the above instruments and agrees to hold Smith 
harn1less and to indemnify him for any loss occasioned 
by any default in the performance of said obligations. 
The deed can be analyzed down to this: Smith trans-
fers to Meagher the 480 acres subject to the lease, 
the modification agreement, and the royalty assign-
ments, and l\f.eagher assumes and agrees to perform 
Smith's obligations with respect to those interests. 
As pointed out above, none of these ·assignments or 
agreements disposed of Smith's reversionary rights or 
his lessor's rights, and therefore 'vhen Smith con-
veyed everything he had to Meager subject to those 
outstanding instruments, Meagher succeeded to Sn1ith's 
reversionary or lessor's rights. 
It is understandable why Smith spelled out the obliga-
tion of his grantees, Meagher and Alexander, in such 
detail. It. was prudent for him to make sure that his 
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grantee should acquire and assume the charges he had 
imposed upon his oil and gas estate. As to the lease, 
he had slight cause to be troubled, because it was ob-
viously an interest in land eligible for recordation, but, 
as to the outstanding royalties, even though the as-
signments expressly state that they shall constitute cov-
enants running with the land, they were also. personal 
obligations of Smith. If the lessee paid the royalties 
due under the lease to Smith's grantee, and for any 
reason the royalty owners were not paid, Srr1ith would 
be personally responsible. Even though such landown-
er's royalties are universally recognized in oil states 
as interests in land eligible for recordation, there 'vas 
no Utah law on the subject, and in some states in the 
early stages of their oil industry, considerable confusion 
has been experienced as to the nature of royalty inter-
ests. Under the circumstances, it was proper for Smith 
to take care, in wording his deeds, to bring forcibly to 
the attention of his grantee the responsibility for recog-
nizing the charges existing against Smith's oil and gas 
estate, and to require them to warrant that they would 
see to it that the lessor's obligations under the lease 
would be performed and that the royalty owners would 
be protected. But it does not follow from this that 
Smith retained his oil and gas estate or his reversion-
ary or lessor's rights therein. On the contrary, if suc.h 
had been his intent, his grantees would have had no 
standing with the lessee and would have no opportunity 
to do any of the things against which Smith sought pro-
tection. If Meagher was not to be the lessor of the 
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lease after acqtnring the property from Sn1ith, there 
was no occasion to require hhn to pay over the royal-
ties to Sn1ith ~s assignees. In other words, if Meagher 
was not to be the lessor~ there 'vas no occasion for 
Smith to insist that 1[eagher perforn1 the lessor's obli-
gations. It follo,vs, of course, that if Meagher "·as to 
become the lessor~ he would succeed to the reversionary 
rights remaining to Smith as lessor. 
To sununarize the above: Smith conveyed the prop-
erty to 1Ieagher subject to whatever interests Smith 
had previously conveyed away. He reserved nothing 
else. Since Smith had not previously conveyed away 
his reversionary rights Meagher becan1e the rever-
sioner.14 
Meagher submits that the foregoing demonstrates 
that the transfer, viewed as a surrender, is a valid re-
linquishment to lVIeagher of whatever · lessee's rights 
Stock had in the lease. 
8. THE STOCK T'O MEA,GHER TRANSFER, VIEWED AS A 
CONVEYANCE, IS EFFECTIVE TO TRANSFER STOCK'S 
INTEREST IN THE LEASE TO MEAGHER. 
When a landowner seeks to clear his title of out-
standing easements, leases or other encumbrances, the 
accepted procedure is to obtain quitclaims from the 
14See pages 14-18 of the trial court's opinion for a discussion 
of the reversionary rights fully supporting Meagher's conten-
tions. FindingH 22 a11d 23 and Conclusion 11 dispose of the 
Issue. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
70 
parties who hold such outstanding interests. Those in-
terests may be valid or invalid but once the holders 
thereof quitclaim them, the landowner's title is cleared. 
Particularly is this procedure adapted to eliminate 
outstanding interests in oil and gas leases. Sometin1es 
the lease interests are in default, sometimes not. But 
once the holder transfers his interest by quitclain1 he 
has conveyed to the landowner the interest he held re-
gardless of whether he was legally obliged to do so. 
Surely this court will take judicial notice of the 'veil-
known fact that oil lands are frequently leased, quit-
claimed, and leased again. We venture the staten1ent 
(though unsupported by the record) that every major 
oil company has at one time or another quitclaimed 
lands subsequently proved to overlay an oil field. 
Thus appellants' repetition here of the conceded fact 
that Stock was not obliged to quitclaim is nothing 
but a reargument of the claim of rescission which has 
been thoroughly covered elsewhere. Of course, it 'vas 
Meagher's purpose to clear up his title. He said so 
very clearly. In fact, the immediate reason which 
1notivated Meagher was to be in a position to lease the 
property to someone else for further exploration. 
Meagher's letters frankly explain this. 
We cannot understand the following statement con-
tained in appellants' brief: ''Meagher was not asking 
for a transfer of interest nor did he believe the Stock 
instrument "" • * to be a transfer or a surrender.~' What 
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else could l\{eagher possibly have thought it was 1 H0 
had asked in unequiyoeal "·ords for a quitclaim. Stock 
complied. }leagher \Vas asking the same thing of 
Phebus. Phebus declined. Neither quitclaim was de-
pendent or conditioned upon receipt of the other. 
~Ieagher \vas frankly and openly gathering up all po-
tential lease interests in order to be free to make a 
new lease. If Stock's transfer was not a conveyance of 
his interest, what 'vas it! 
Appellants con1plain that ''This court is now called 
upon to determine the effect of the instrument by the 
sheer weight of its words.'' We plead guilty to this 
charge. How else are documents construed 1 Meagher 
does not deny that the words contained in the recitals in 
the quitclaim which Stock gave him require explana-
tion because they recite conclusions of law which were 
subsequently held by this court to be erroneous. IIow-
ever, as demonstrated above, Stock was not misled by 
these words for he paid no attention to them. 
This brings us to the words contained in the grant-
ing clause of the instrun1ent and to the real subject of 
this section of appellants' argument. We find-the fol-
lowing: 
"Now, therefore, know .all men by these presents: 
That Paul Stock does hereby cancel, release, relin-
quish and surrender to N. J. Meagher, his heirs and 
assigns, all of his right, title and interest in and 
to the said oil and gas lease and all of his right, 
title and interest in and to the said oil and ~aR 
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lease in so far as it conveys the lands above de-
scribed.'' 
These are the ·words of a quitclaim deed. The essence 
of a quitclaim lies in the fact that it only conveys ''the 
right, title and interest" of the grantor. The purpose 
of this phrase is to avoid any implied warranty of title. 
It only passes what the grantor had. It promises noth-
ing. It is a convenient form of conveyance where a 
grantor doubts whether he has an interest. It was prop-
erly used for that purpose when Stock conveyed nothing 
to Chas. S. Hill in the Stock-Hill-J uhan deal. But if 
the grantor does have an interest, that interest is con-
veyed. Yes, it is the "sheer weight" of these "words" 
which conveyed to Meagher whatever interests in the 
lease Stock then owned. 
This court will search 1n va1n through appellants' 
brief to find any authority denying vitality to words of 
conveyance similar to the combination of verbs used in 
this document. True, the same result could have been 
more simply obtained by using the simpler verb ''quit-_ 
claim" or "grant" or "convey" or any number of 
similar expressions. But the meaning of these words 
cannot be misunderstood. Their meaning was to take 
from Stock and give to Meagher • ~all of his right, title 
and interest in and to the said oil and gas lease". It 
cannot be attacked by clain1ing inadequate words of con-
veyance. Here again, as it has so often occurred during 
this litigation, when the facts are put. forward as they 
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exist rather than as the~~ n1 i,qht have been, the issue is 
solved by application of the n1ost elementary legal 
principles. 
There are n1any cases holding these words adequate 
for purpo~es of qnitclain1. Osburn D. Finkelstein, 189 
Ind. 90: 126 N.E. 11, is particularly interesting be-
cause the \vords of grant there \Vere ''surrenders, can-
cels, annuls, and releases''. The only difference is that 
our docun1ent says ''relinquish" where the cited case 
employs the verb" annuls". In the Osbo1·n case the doc-
ument of transfer \Vas held to be an effective quitclaim. 
The court said : 
''Appellant does not say what word or words should 
here be added to make this release sufficient. We 
are left to imagine that he means 'quitclaim'. We 
hold it sufficient without that word." 
In Ruthrauff v. Silver King Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 Pac. 
(2d) 338, it was held that the statutory form of quit-
claim deed is permissive only and use of the words •' re-
mise, release and quitclaim'' were sufficient to transfer 
all of grantor's interest. 
In the early and leading case of Field v. Colom,bet, 
9 Fed. Cas. 12, Case No. 4 764, the federal court sitting 
In California said: 
''Any words in a ·deed indicating an intention to 
transfer the estate, interest or claim of the grantor 
\vill be a sufficient conveyance, whethey they be such 
as were generally used in a deed of feoffment, 
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or of bargain or sale, or of release, _irrespective of 
the fact of possession of grantor or grantee, or of 
the statute of uses.'' 
In Evenson v. Webster (So. Dak.), 53 N.W. 747, the 
court held that the simple word "give" was sufficient 
to · convey real property, citing Field v. Colombet, 
supra. 
In Olson v. Cornwell, 134 Cal. App. 419, the court ap-
proved the following careless granting clause: ''shall 
have and from now on are entitled to'', saying: 
''It seems clear from the language of the parties 
that it was the intention to make a present transfer 
to plaintiffs of an undivided interest in the prop-
erty; and where the intent is expressed it is suffi-
cient, whatever may be the inaccuracy of expres-
sion, or the inaptness of the words used, and the 
courts will give the instruments that effect.'' 
In .Adams v. Reed, 11 Utah 480, 40 Pac. 720, affirmed 
168 U.S. 573, a deed of "release" was recognized and 
treated as a quitclaim deed. 
9. MEAGHER'S LANDOWNER'S ROYALTY INTERES·T OAN 
BE ADJUDICATED IN THIS ACTION. 
We now come to an entirely distinct phase of the 
case. The argument thus far has been concerned with 
the determination of the o'vnership of outstanding les-
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see ·s right~ in the lease. The subject of this section is 
the o'vnership of an undivided one-third of two per 
cent in lando,vners' royalties "~hich 'vere originally cre-
ated by )[ .P. Sn1ith "~hen he owned the property. We 
are satisfied that all parties agree that these land-
owners' royalty interests are not in any sense of the 
·word interests in the leasehold but represent a dif-
ferent and distinct interest in the lands which are the 
subject of this litigation. 
The question is \Vhether Meagher owns landowner's 
royalties totaling 2% in oil and gas, or, as defendants 
claim, 11h?'c in oil and 2% in gas. 
There is no dispute that of the landowner's royalties 
totaling 12%% created by Smith, 2% was ultimately 
transferred to Meagher. Sn1ith transferred ~ 1% in-
terest to ~Ieagher directly (A-46) and Meagher obtained 
the other 1% interest from Alexander (A-55), who in 
turn had acquired it from Smith. 
That Meagher is entitled to 2% royalties with re-
spect to gas is not disputed. As to oil, however, his 
royalty interest was reduced to 11/s% by an assignment 
fro1n him and the other royalty owners to Stock and 
Phebus on October 11, 1930 ( A-40). As this time, Stock 
and Phebus anticipated an assignment of the lease to. 
Standard Oil Company, but in order to reduce the 
burden of outstanding royalties, Standard Oil Company 
insisted upon the 18lh1% outstanding royalties ('vhich 
consisted of landowner's royalties totaling 12%% and 
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Ashley Valley Oil Company's overriding royalties of 
6:%) being reduced. Accordingly, the royalty owners 
who signed document A-40 were reducing by one-third 
their royalty interests on the terms set forth in A-40. 
The· intent of the instrument is clear. It may be para-
phrased as follows: It relates to oil royalties only; 
its purpose is to obtain the drilling of a well by Stand-
ard Oil Company of California or one of its sub-
sidiaries; if Stock and Phebus succeed, within the lim-
itations provided in the agreement, in obtaining a test 
well on the structure, the royalties assigned in A-40 
are extinguished. The limitations in question are 
that Standard Oil Company, or its subsidiary, shall 
commence a well on the Ashley Valley structure within 
certain specified time limits, but if such well is not 
drilled as contemplated, then Stock and Phebus agree 
to turn back the royalty interests transferred to them 
in A-40. 
The lease was assigned to Standard Oil Company of 
California by Stock and Phebus (A-12). About a 
year later Standard assigned it to its subsidiary, The 
California Company (A-13). Thereafter neither Stand-
ard Oil Company of California nor The California 
Company, or any other subsidiary of Standard, ever 
drilled or even commenced a well on the Ashley Valley 
structure. Thus Stock and Phebus were obliged to 
return to Meagher the two-thirds of 1% oil royalty 
he had ·contributed to facilitate the deal with Standard 
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on the tern1s set forth in A-40. Rtock and Phebus 
thereupon becan1e the trustees of Meagher as to this 
royalty interest and ~Ieagher again became the bene-
ficial o'vner thereof. It is this equitable title to this 
two-thirds of 1% oil royalty that Meagher seeks to 
quiet. 
A quiet title action is appropriate to establish the 
existence of this equitable title in Meagher. The rule 
is now well established that one n1ay prove whatever 
title one o'vns, legal or equitable, under general allega-
tions of o'vnership in a quiet title action. 
State r. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 292 P. 987; 
Olive·r v. Dougherty (Ariz.), 68 P. 553; 
Van l'"ranken v. Granite County (Mont.), 90 P. 
164. 
The royalty interest involved is an interest in real 
estate, and, as such, is provable under a general allega-
tion of ownership of the land. In Kansas, the rule 
seems to be otherwise, but all other authorities we 
have found hold that royalties created by the land-
owner are interests in land. 
Watkins v. Slaughter (Tex.), 189 S.W. (2d) 699; 
La Laguna Ranch v. Dodge 18 Cal. (2d) 132, 
114 P. (2d) 351; 
Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dixon (Wyo.), 
122 P. (2d) 842; 
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Williams' Administrator v. Union Bank db Trust 
Co. (Ky.), 143 S.W. (2d) 297; 
Veal v. Thom,ason (Tex.), 159 S.W. (2d) 472. 
Therefore, Meagher is entitled to a decree declaring 
that he is the owner of the equitable title to the two-
thirds of 1 ro landowner's royalty free from any claims 
of the defendants herein in addition to the 1%% roy-
alty which is concededly owned by Meagher. 
It is true that the legal title to the disputed two-
thirds of one per cent was transferred to Stock and 
Phebus. Defendants say that if this interest is bene-
ficially owned by Meagher, his remedy is to sue in 
equity to enforce specific performance of a reconvey-
ance. If such remedy does exist, it does not preclude 
declaration by this court of Meagher's equitable title, 
which is all that Meagher seeks at this time. As dem-
onstrated above, the existence of an equitable title is 
one which can be ascertained in a quiet title action. 
The record discloses that there have been many as-
signments of interests owned and claimed to be owned 
by Stock and Phebus since they acquired Meagher's 
royalty. ~-,rankly, plaintiff is not sure whether these 
defendants have retained the legal title to this royalty, 
and, if they have parted with it, specific perforn1ance 
would be an empty remedy. All that Meagher requests 
in this action with respect to his royalty is a declara-
tion that he is beneficially entitled to it. Thereafter, 
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if it deYelops that it ha~ hePn 'vrongfully transferred~ 
whether or not to a bona fide purchaser for value with .. 
out notice, he 'vill at least havP laid the foundation of 
ownership to 'vhich he is entitled nnd can then pursue 
such ren1edy as tnay be neePssary. When Stock and 
Phebus failed to reconvey as they agreed to, they be-
caine constructive or resulting trustees for Meagher's 
benefit of this royalty interest. ~leagher should not be 
forced to sue all of the others 'vho have becon1e in-
volved in this eo1nplica ted chain of title if his trustees 
have violated their trust. The obvious multiplicity of 
actions 'vhich would ensue points up the very reason 
why the courts have and do take cognizance of equi-
table interests in quiet title proceedings. 
The appellants seen1 to indulge in asserting interests 
to which they are not entitled and then claiming laches 
when they are asked to disgorge. Such tactics are not 
favored by courts who are called upon to declare equi-
table titles held by resulting or constructive trustees. 
A landowner's royalty is real estate. If one should 
transfer his horne for a limited purpose one does not 
risk loss of o'vnership by leaving the title with one's 
trustee after the limited purpose is accomplished. 
'rhe final paragraph of Section 9 of appellants' brief 
co1npletely confuses interests in the lease with land-
owner's royalties. 'l,his paragraph criticizes the trial 
court for failing to hold that Stock's transfer to 
Meagher affected outstanding lando"rner 's royalties., 
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But that transfer pertains only to lessee's rights under 
the lease. It has no bearing upon landowner's royalties 
as distinguished from overriding royalties. J_Jandown-
er 's royalti~s do not depend upon the existence of an 
oil lease for their validity. They are interests in the 
oil and gas estate created by the landowner. On 
the other hand, overriding royalties do depend upon 
the existence of the lease from which they are carved 
out. They are interests in the production and are cre-
ated by the lessee. If a lease is extinguished, the over-
riding royalties fall with it, and this is what the trial 
court spelled out in the ~riginal opinion. However, in 
recognition of the protection against this very thing 
which was saved to R. C. Hill15 when he assigned 
the lessee's rights to Utah Oil Refining Co. (A-2), 
Meagher stipulated and conceded that the transfer 
from Stock could not cut off the overriding royalty. 
The fact that the briefs below did not call the trial 
court's attention to this portion of the record was cured 
by the findings and the decree after Meagher pointed 
out the inadvertence. 
But landowner's royalties are interests which are 
carved out of the fee estate, not from a particular 
lease. They are not dependent upon the existence of 
a lease for their validity and existence. Thus when 
15Ashley Valley Oil Company obtained its rights from R. C. 
Hill by assignment of November 10, 1924 (A-3). Please refer to 
chart attached. 
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Stock transferred to ~leaghPr ·'all of his right, title 
and interP~ t in and to said oil and gas lea~'-;e '' he did 
not convey any royalty interest to Meagher and the 
point 'vhich appellant refer~ to as "interesting to 
observe'' beco1ues 1nea.ningless and leads only to con-
fusion. 
The issue cone.erning ~{eagher 's outstanding land-
owner'~ royalty is discussed in the trial court's opinion 
at pages 39-44. 
10. STOCK IS BARRED BY LACHES FROM ASSERTING 
RESCISSION OF HIS TRANSFER TO MEA;GHER. 
In order to discuss each point suggested by appel-
lants in the order presented by the1n, the above con-
tention which is asserted in Meagher's behalf appears 
here somewhat out of context. 
It will be noted that the defenses of lack of consid-
eration, fraud, estoppel, and mistake are all directed 
to the basic issue of rescission. 
We sincerely sought to meet each of these conten-
tions in the order presented to demonstrate that there 
is no merit to any of ·them. We believe we have demon-
strated that Stock never could have avoided his own 
transfer under the facts of the case. 
But if for any conceivable reason the right to rescind 
ever arose in Stock's favor his action to assert it comes 
too late. 
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. He executed the transfer in O·ctober of 1944. A suit 
was then pending hostile to his interest in the lease 
and he was named as a defendant although service had 
not been effected upon him. Jurisdiction over Stock 
was never perfected by Meagher. Thus Meagher aban. 
doned his efforts to bring Stock into the litigation after 
receipt of the transfer. By April of 1945 Stock had 
discussed his transfer to :hieagher with Juhan's repre. 
sentative, Chas. Hill. It 'vas then decided to contest 
the legal effect of the transfer. Stock then quitclaimed 
what was no more than his right to litigate with 
Meagher under an agreen1ent that would yield Stock 
one-eighth of what might be gleaned from that litiga-
tion. In June of 1945 ~Ieagher, who had learned of 
Stock's quitclaim to Hill but did not kno'v the purpose, 
wrote to Stock. He pointed out that Stock had already 
transferred his lease interest to Meagher. He pointed 
out that the quitclaim to Hill would confuse Meagher's 
title. He pointed out that the quitclaim would compli-
cate the problem of straightening out the landowner's 
royalty situation. He asked Stock for an explanation. 
Stock re1nained silent and continued to secrete his in-
tentions until August of 1949, when he voluntarily ap-
peared in the action. Meanwhile Meagher continued 
with his quiet title action. This court determined that 
the lease was still valid. The case was remanded for 
further proceedings. Stock and his associates then 
becarne bolder for they no·w ~;new that they had a clea.r 
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right to a one-half i,ntercsf i,n the lea..~e and could get 
it all if they eould shoulder ~feagher aside. They also 
knew their expenses 'vould he recouped if they struck 
oil. The~· decided to drill. Stock bought a new interest in 
1948 just before the drilling connnenced. According to 
Stock's 0\\11 e.ontentions, this purehase gave hi1n a par-
ticipation independent of ~[eagher 's ulthnate interest. 
Oil was discovered. Meagher continued to press his suit. 
Appellants then realized that l\Ieagher could establish 
his ownership of the for1ner Stock one-half interest 
unless the transfer could be rescinded. Juhan's attor-
neys then filed an answer and counterclaim in Stock's 
name setting forth for the first time all possible ·claims 
for rescission. Stock did not even know what ·those 
claims "'.,.ere or on what theory it was hoped the rescis-
sion could be established. He did not read the pleading. 
He was called to the stand by Meagher's counsel, not his 
own. Then his own testimony demonstrated beyond 
question that none of the many theories, upon which 
he might have had a rescission, were actually founded 
upon fact. 
Unless Stock by action first taken in 1949 can rescind 
a transfer made in 1944 he cannot prevail here. Add 
to this the fact that quiet title litigation had been going 
on throughout the entire period. Add to this the fact 
that oil \Vas discovered in 1948. Add to this an intention 
on the part of Stock· and Juhan to disavow the trans-
fer, which plan had been made in 1945. Add to this 
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the refusal by Stock to state his position when asked 
by letter to do so in 1945. If ever a claimant was 
barred by laches Stock is that person. 
At this point we cite for Meagher's benefit every 
case on the subject of laches which has been put for-
ward in this appeal by appellants. In addition, we 
mention Frailey v. McGarry (Utah 1949), 211 Pac. (2d) 
840. In that case the purchaser of land sought to 
rescind for fraud. This court said: 
''After reviewing the record of events as they 
transpired, we find it unnecessary to determine 
whether defendant, by fraud, induced the plaintiff 
to enter into the contract. There are facts present 
in the instant case which preclude plaintiff from 
rescinding the contract for the reasons he alleges. 
It is well settled by decisions from this court that 
a person claiming the right to rescind a contract 
because of misrepresentations or fraud, must, after 
discovery of the fraud, announce his purpose and 
adhere to it. .Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493; 51 Pac. 
2d 222. We have also held that the purchaser 1nust 
evidence his intent to rescind by some unequivocal 
act, either by notice or some act amounting to 
notice of intent to rescind. McKellar Real Estate 
Co. v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97; 218 Pac. 128." 
In the Frailey case, the plaintiff was barred because 
he waited only ten n1onths before notifying the plain-
tiff of his intention to rescind. In the case at bar, the 
interval was nearly five years. 
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See Del..~an1ar J/-i.nes of J/onfana v. 1llackay (C.C.A. 
9th), 104 Fed. (2d) ~71.- in \Yhich larhe~ 'vas applied 
where the period before notiee of rescission 'vas given 
was 19 1nonths. 
In 30 C.J.S., p. 540, the rule is stated thus: 
'• If the property involved is of a speculative or 
fluctuating- nature, n1ore than ordinary pro1nptness 
is required of a clai1nant. He must present his 
clahn at the earliest possible time. This rule is 
applied with great strictness in the case of oil or 
n1ining property since it is of an especially pre-
carious nature, and is exposed to the utmost fluc-
tuations in value.'' 
In T'UJin-Lick Oil Company v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 
23 L. Ed. :328, the Supreme Court of the United States 
refused rescission in a transaction involving oil prop-
erties and held the claimant to be barred by laches. 
The opinion points out the necessity for strictness 
where property of fluctuating value is involved. 
We hesitate to present the defense of laches, because 
of its ele1nent of confession and avoidance. We believe 
that Magher is entitled to the decree of this court con-
firining the findings below which establish that he was 
guilty of no fraud; that he committed no deceit; that 
there is no actionable mistake; and that the attempt to 
distort his n1isa pprehension as to the legal status of the 
lease into a 1nisrepresentation relied upon by Stock is 
not ~upported by the evidence. However, in excess of 
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Stock and anyone claiming under him from rescinding 
the transfer he gave to Meagher in October of 1944. 
SUMMARY AND CON·CLUSION. 
With apologies for imposing such a long brief upon a 
.busy court, we will atten1pt here to briefly summarize 
the entire argument point by point. 
1. The court did not err in permitting 1\{eagher to 
amend his reply because: ( 1) The reply actually added 
nothing to Meagher's overall claims. His con1plaint 
asserted .a fee simple. His reply merely conceded that 
he could only prove a lesser estate. (2) The amended 
reply was appropriate to dispute the affirmative claims 
presented in the pleadings of appellants. As such the 
reply was a proper answer to affirmative contentions. 
It merely defined the issues more precisely than 
Meagher's original reply which denied that the an-
swering defendants had any interest in the property. 
2. Meagher is the real party in interest because: 
( 1) Before he transferred his interest during the liti-
gation he had acquired all of the interests he now 
asserts, and (2) the transfer by a litigant of the 
subject matter of a suit, pending litigation, does not 
prevent completion of the litigation in that party's 
name. 
3. Meagher is neither guilty of laches nor is he 
estopped from asserting his interest. As to laches: 
(1) There 'vas no undue delay. Meagher began his 
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action long before any drilling 'vas coinmenced and 
has vigorously continued its prosecution. ( 2) Since all 
appellants kne"~ that ~Jeagher had for1nally disputed 
their elain1s since the very day the action was com-
menced, there 'vas no basis for any appellant to con-
strue any delay "Thirh 1nay haYe occurred as a waiver 
by ~Ieagher of any right he had. As to estoppel: 
(1) There is no factual basis for such claim. (2) No 
appellant took any action based upon any representa-
tion of ~Ieagher. (3) There was no reliance upon any 
action or inaction attributable to Meagher. 
4. There was no fraud. 
5. The Stock to ~leagher transfer is supported by 
valid legal consideration because: (1) Stock thereby 
was relieved of his obligations under the lease as a 
lessee. ( 2) Meagher did not pursue the quiet title suit 
as against Stock after he received the transfer until 
Stock voluntarily appeared. 
6. Rescission cannot be granted for mistake be-
cause: ( 1.) The only nus take involved in the entire 
action was Meagher's legal misapprehension as to the 
validity of the lease; (2) Stock did not participate in 
in that mistake; and ( 3) ·Stock placed no reliance upon 
any representations 1nade by Meagher with respect to 
the legal status of the lease. 
7. The transfer, viewed as a surrender, can be sus-
tained beeause: (1) It was not inconsistent with any 
provision of the lease ; ( 2) as between Stock and 
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Meagher the provisions of the lease could be super-
seded by any rnethod of surrender acceptable to them; 
( 3) the document is supported by valid legal consid-
eration as described above; ( 4) while Stock could not 
surrender the interests of any co-lessee he could sur-
render his own lessee's rights, and that is all he did; 
and ( 5) Meagher was the reversioner becaues he ac-
quired via M. P. Smith and Alexander all of the rights 
and interests of the landowner subject only to out-
standing royalties and the lease itself. 
8. The transfer is effective as a conveyance because 
its words of grant meet all the requirements of a quit-
claim deed. 
9. Meagher is the equitable owner of the one-third 
of two per cent landowner's royalty which Stock and 
Phebus hold for him because: ( 1) their right to retain 
this royalty was based on definite and specific condi-
tions which have not been met; and ( 2) a quiet title 
action is an appropriate action in which to determine 
ariy interest in property, legal or equitable. 
10. Although Stock has failed to make out a proper 
c.ase for rescission, he is also barred from asserting 
any such right because: (1) he knew as early as 1945 
he would attack his own conveyance; ( 2) as early as 
1945 he secreted his intentions from Meagher even 
after express inquiry; (3) he permitted nearly five 
years to elapse before making any claim or taking any 
action ; and ( 4) his first action was taken only after 
oil ·was discovered. 
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Thus ~feagher has squarely faced each point raised 
by appellants. l~pon analysis it 'vill be. seen that the 
solution to the case lies in its factual background. On 
the • 'paper rerord' · as disclosed by the title docun1ents 
alone it does appear that Stock, eonceivably, might 
have been Inisled as to his legal rights. This explains 
the plausible pleadings presented by Juhan's lawyers 
in Stock's behalf. But Stock 'vould have given Meagher 
the requested transfer regardless of whether he wa~ 
obliged to do so. He 'vas finished with the Ashley 
Valley oil play. In any event, he was completely in-
different as to the situation. It was only when Juhan 
can1e along and suggested to Stock that exploration 
might be financed that Stock sought to "back in" for 
a mere one-eighth of his former interest if Juhan could 
retrieve it from ~ieagher. The theories· of Stock's 
pleadings, though untenable, are not unreasonable. But 
when Stock was called to the stand by Meagher he was 
not acquainted 'vith those pleadings. Thereupon all 
support for the elaborate theories put forth in Stock's 
behalf fell away. 
For a time it appeared. to Meagher's counsel that 
the case would present interesting problems of oil and 
gas law. We welcomed the opportunity to present our 
views to the Utah courts in the hope that we might 
contribute so1nething to Utah's now unfolding law of 
oil and g-as. However, the case is not concerned with 
these interesting and important problems. Although 
the facts themselves are interesting, the applicable law 
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is limited to basic principles well known to and often 
expounded by this court. This case turns on its facts. 
The only lesson of the case so far as concerns oil 
and gas is that oil men are tough and they will gamble. 
Once appellants knew that they were safely entitled 
to a one-half interest in this lease they knew their 
drilling expenses were safe if oil could be discovered. 
They also knew they stood the chances afforded by 
litigation- to get the oth~r one-half. A Texas oil man 
once said: ''Drill 'em up and let the oil buy your 
title." That attitude has been assumed in this case 
but it has failed. 
We need not weep for these appellants notwithstand~ 
ing the touching plea with which their brief concludes. 
They will fare handson1ely from the proceds of their 
one-half interest in the leasehold. They have lost only 
what they knew they did not have. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decree below 
should be affirmed. 
Dated: October 29, 1951. 
HERBERT vAN DAM, 
GILBERT c. WHEAT, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
N.J. Meagher. 
(Appendices A and B Follow.) 
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Appendix A 
·Here,vith \Ye set forth extrac-ts fron1 declarations of 
trust disclosing the Stock-Hill-.. T uhan deal and other 
related 1natters. En1phasis herein is ours. 
Exhibit ~~-±8, an unrecorded agreement, was executed 
by Chas. S. Hill 1 in favor of Paul Stock on April 14, 
1945. 
The declaration refers to the quitclaim which Stock 
gave Hill on the san1e day (A-19), and then proceeds as 
follows: 
''Hill agrees to investigate the title of Stock in 
respect to said lands: to manage the interest of 
said Stock therein with all the rights of ownership, 
including the right to * :::· * bring suits to assert, 
protect and defend the said interest; to do whatever 
in his judgment Inay be advisable to make. said in-
terest valuable and saleable; and to pay all ex-
penses in relation thereto. * * * It is the purpose 
of the parties that ultin1ately the said interest shall 
be converted into money or into a property with 
unquestioned title. * * * what remains after pay-
ment of all the expenses and the satisfaction of all 
obligations shall belong to the parties in the pro-
portion of 12% per cent to Stock and 871h per cent 
to Hill.'' 
1Stock testified that Juhan told him that Hill was acting for 
Juhan at the tin1e this declaration of trust was executed. 
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The follo,ving is an extract from Exhibit A-49, an 
unrecorded agreen1ent between Juhan and Chas. S. Hill 
entered into January 5, 1946. Many of its clauses are 
exact copies of the phraseology of Exhibit 48. Among 
other things, this agreement provides: 
"Juhan agrees to investigate the title of Hill in 
respect to said land; to manage the interest of said 
Hill therein with all the rights of ownership, in-
cluding the right * * •X: to bring suits to assert, 
protect and defend the said interest; to do what-
ever in his judgment may be advisable to make 
said interest valuable and saleable; and to pay all 
expenses in relation thereto * * * It is the purpose 
of the parties that ultimately the said interest shall 
be converted into money or into a property with 
unquestioned title * * * '' 
The following provisions of this agreement reflect 
the parties' understanding 'Of Stock's position in the 
transaction : 
"It is recited that this declaration is 1nade with 
the knowledge of and subject to a declaration by 
Hill to one Paul Stock, of Cody, Wyoming, by the 
terms of which the said Stock was to receive 12% 
per cent of the net." 
The following is particularly important: 
''In order to fully show all interests that may 
affect the interested parties as of this date, and 
without increasing the interest of the said Stock, 
it is now recited that one J. L. Dougan has agreed 
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to finance all nece~8ary litigation for an undivided 
50 per cent interest of the reeovery from the above 
described land, 'vhich has been obtained by two 
quitclaiin deeds and assign1nents, one from Ray 
Phebus and one from J?aul Stock.'' 
The follo,ving discloses the reeognition by the parties 
of the necessity of getting rid of Meagher's interest. 
Thus: 
d ~~ 12¥2 per cent interest in the said recovery 
fron1 the above described acreage belongs to said 
Stock, based on his half interest when and if the 
title to his interest is sustained by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction or if his former interest is 
adjudicated as belonging to N. J. Meagher, then 
and in such event the said Stock shall have no 
interest.'' 
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EXTRACTS FRtOM TES'TIMONY OF PAUL STOCK. 
For the convenience of the court the following 
extract is furnished which contains some of the more 
important portions of Stock's testimony: 
By Mr. Wheat: 
Q. Your name is Paul Stock~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you are one of the defendants in this action 7 
A. Yes, .sir. 
Q. And what business are you in, Mr. Stock? 
A. The oil business. 
Q. How long have you been in the oil business! 
A. Ever since I was a boy. 
Q. You were engaged in the oil business during the 
fall of 1944' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And by the end of 1944 had you dealt extensively 
with oil leases? 
A. Quite a few, yes, sir. 
Q. And royalties 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And oil interests of all kinds 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And wasn't it about 1944 that you sold a good 
part of your oil interests to the Texas Company? 
A. That '.s right. 
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Q. .A.s a 1natter of fact, in that deal you received 
several million dollars for those interests, didn't you Y 
A. ''r ell, it was involved. 
• • • 
Q. N ov~T 'vhen you signed this release, this Exhibit 
A-30, did you understand it to be a release of all of 
your interests in the oil lease covering the lands in-
volved in this suit' 
A. No, sir. 
• • 
Q. Nov..,. Mr. Stock, tell us in your own words what 
your understanding was with respect to that document. 
~Ir. Gustin. No'v we object to that, your Honor, on 
the same grounds. The document speaks for itself, it 
is the best evidence. 
• • 
The Court. Let me have the question read, will you? 
(Question read.) 
The Court. He may answer it. 
A. I thought that I was releasing to Mr. Meagher 
a royalty that we had obtained from him to drill a well.1 
There ":-as so1ne overriding royalty and we wanted to 
reduce the royalty, which we did do. And this, the 
1 Note that the only explanation given by Stock as to the 
state of his mind when he executed the release has never been 
urged by appellants' counsel in this litigation. Of course~ an 
error based upon such negligence would not support a rescis-
sion. Furthermore, the trial court has rejected the excuses 
offered by Stock. 
Appellants have consistently urged that Stock was misled as 
to the legal status of the lease. The importance of this testi-
mony is that it excludes that possibility. 
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overriding royalty, amounted to so much, and if we 
didn't drill the well, we had-I don't know whether we 
legally give it back, we intended to give him back his 
royalty if we didn't drill the well, but we did later 
drill the well. 2 
Mr. Wheat. Q. But in any event, the state of your 
mind at the time you executed that document was that 
you were giving back to Meagher the royalties he had 
transferred to you and Mr. Phebus in order to cut down 
the outstanding royalties at the time you transferred 
the lease to the Standard Oil Company, isn't that right 1 
A. That was right . 
• • • • 
Q. Did you read the release before you signed it' 
A. I never read it thoroughly. I just glanced over 
it and signed it and sent it back. 
Q. · And did you read the letter with which it was 
sent to you~ 
A. I glanced ~at it, yes. 
Q. Now about six months after you signed the re-
lease to 1\'Ir. Meagher, you gave a quitclaim deed of 
your oil and gas rights under this Sheridan lease, to a 
person by the name of Charles S. Hill, didn't. yont 
A. Yes, sir. 
2N ote the inconsistency of Stock's testimony. He claims that 
he was not required to return the royalty in the same answer 
which assigns the return of the royalty as his n1otive for exe-
cuting the release of Meagher. ' 
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Q. N o'v 'Yho 'vas Charles S. Hill·? 
A. He had been a. friend of 1nine for a good many 
years over there~ interested in the oil business and 
leasing business. 
Q. .Lind he didn't pay you anything for that quit-
claim, did he 1 
A. No. 
• 
Q. In the negotiations 'vith you and Charles Hill 
at that tilne, he said dtransfer what interests you have 
in this lease to Ine and I 'vill try to make something 
of it,'' in words to that effect? 
• 
A. Mr. Hill stated that the property at Vernal in 
Ashley \ 1 alley 'vas in litigation, and if I would turn 
it over to him on that agreement, that he would handle 
it and litigate it, or clean it up, clean the title. 
Q. Then in consurm11ation of that agreement with 
Hill, he gave you another document called a Declara-
tion of Trust, didn't he~ 
A. The trust agree1nent was signed along with it. 
Q. Now I show you Exhibit A-48 and ask you if 
that isn't a photostatic copy of the trust agreement 
you just referred to 1 
• 
Q. It is 1 
A. Yes. 
* 
• 
• 
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Q. Did you .subsequently have a conversation with 
Mr. Juhan, in which you discussed your deal with 
Charles S. Hill~ 
A. I had a good many different discussions with 
Mr. Juhan. 
Q. Well, in any of those discussions did Juhan tell 
you that Charles S. Hill had been working for him 
when he got that quitclaim deed from you? 
A. He told me that he had acquired the Hill in-
terest. 
Q. And he told you that he sent Hill over to you 
just for that purpose, didn't he~ 
A. Yes. 
• • • 
Q. At the time of your transaction with Charles S. 
Hill, did you tell him you· had given the release to 
Mr. Meagher? 
A. He told me, and we discussed it. 
Q. And part of his job, after that deal was made, 
was to eliminate any contentions that Meagher might 
make with respect to that release, isn't that correctt 
A. Yes. 
• • • 
Q. So my question is, after October of 1944 did you 
ever give-comn1unicate to Mr. Meagher, by word or 
by letter, or otherwise, that you intended to cancel or 
repudiate the release that you had given him in Octoebr 
of 1944! 
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A. I don't think there 'vas ever any communication 
behveen ~1r. ~Ieag·her and· n1yself to that effect. 
L • 
• 
Q. Ko'v in July of 1948 you purchased a 25 per cent 
interest in the Sheridan lease from Juhan, didn't you! 
A. Yes, sir. 
• 
Q. Juhan then got the one eighth that you had re-
served in your deal with Hill, I 1nean in July of 1948~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you paid Juhan some $19,500 in that trans-
action, didn't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So you gave Juhan, according to your position, 
the $19,500 cash, and your old one-eighth contingent 
interest, didn't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Juhan gave you a quarter interest in the 
lease, according to your contentions, didn't he' 
(Witness nods head affirmatively.) 
Q. And you contended that the quarter interest in 
the lease that you then got from Juhan was traceable 
to the Phebus source of title, is that right~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
• • • • 
Q. But it is a fact, isn't it, Mr. Stock, that the 
reason you \vere putting good rnoney into that trans-
action was to get a position in that lease which was 
independent of any clain1s of Meagher, isn't that true~ 
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A. I was putting the money into the lease with 
Juhan and with Mr. Dougan in order to drill the well, 
that we drilled. 
Q. I know. Of course you were anticipating drilling 
a .. well, but you were trying to get a 25 per cent in-
-terest in that lease, win, lose or draw, in the case with 
Meagher, isn't that true~ 
A. That's the way the deed is. 
Q. Well, that was your position too, wasn't it 7 
A. That's right. 
• 
Q. Now have you read the answer and counterclaim 
filed in your behalf in this case~ 
A. .No, sir. 
Q. Haven't read it to this day' 
A. No, sir. 
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